In the totality of the above circumstances, I have no  doubt that a legally valid contract had indeed come into existence between the parties which contained an arbitration clause for adjudication of disputes that may arise between them. Ques..

In the totality of the above circumstances, I have no  doubt that a legally valid contract had indeed come into existence between the parties which contained an arbitration clause for adjudication of disputes that may arise between them. Question No.(2) is accordingly answered in the affirmative.In the result, I allow this petition and appoint Mr. Justice Anil Dev Singh, former Chief Justice of Rajasthan High Court as sole Arbitrator for adjudication of the disputes between the parties arising out of the contract referred to in the petition. The Arbitrator shall be free to fix his fee and charges and the ratio in which the same shall be paid by the parties. The parties shall appear before the Arbitrator on 10th 21December, 2010 for further directions. Registry shall forthwith forward a copy of this order to the worthy Arbitrator for information and necessary action. 

Arbitration and Concilation Act, 1996

Whether the award will be set aside or not is a different question and that has to be decided by the appropriate Court. In this appeal, this Court is concerned only with the question whether by allowing the amendment, as prayed for by the appellan..

Whether the award will be set aside or not is a different question and that has to be decided by the appropriate Court. In this appeal, this Court is concerned only with the question whether by allowing the amendment, as prayed for by the appellant, the Court will allow material facts to be brought on record in the pending setting aside proceeding.  Judging the case from this angle, this Court is of the opinion that in the interest of justice and considering the fairness of procedure, the Court should allow the appellant to bring those materials on record as those materials are not wholly irrelevant or they may have a bearing on the appellant’s plea for setting aside the award.  Nothing said in this judgment will be construed as even remotely expressing any opinion on the legality 29of the award. That question will be decided by the Court where setting aside proceeding is pending. The proceeding for setting aside the award may be disposed of as early as possible, preferably within 4 months. For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal succeeds. The order of the High Court is set aside and that of the court below is restored. No order as to costs.

Arbitration and Concilation Act, 1996

 Unless the jurisdiction of the Indian Courts is not specifically excluded at least part I of the Show

 Unless the jurisdiction of the Indian Courts is not specifically excluded at least part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 whereunder there is a power to appoint Arbitrator is covered by Section 11(6) of the Act, this Court would have jurisdiction to appoint an Arbitrator even if the arbitration is to be governed by foreign law. [Para 8] [256-E-F] Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A. and ANOTHER 2002(4) SCC 105; Indtel Technical Services Private Ltd. v. W.S. Atkins Rail Ltd. 2008 (10) SCC 308; Citation Infowares Ltd. v. Equinox Corporation 2009 (7) SCC 220; National Thermal Power Corporation v. Singer Company and ANOTHER 1992 (3) SCC 551; CMC Ltd. v. Unit Trust of India and Ors. 2007 (10) SCC 751- referred to. 2. The arbitrability of the dispute is to be determined in terms of the law governing arbitration agreement and the arbitration proceedings has to be conducted in accordance with the curial law. [Para 12] [268-E-G] Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. v. ONGC Ltd. and Ors. 1998 (1) SCC 305 - relied on. The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in England by Mustill and Boyd 2nd Edition - referred to. 3.1 Article 23 of the Distributorship Agreement is to be read in the backdrop of Article 22 and more particularly, Article 22.1. It is clear from the language of Article 22.1 that the whole Agreement would be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of The Republic of Korea. On seeing the language of Article 23.1 in the light of the Article 22.1, it is clear that the parties had agreed that the disputes arising out of the Agreement between them would be finally settled by the arbitration in Seoul, Korea. The rules of arbitration to be made applicable were the Rules of International Chamber of Commerce. This gives the prima facie impression that the seat of arbitration was only in Seoul, South Korea. [Paras 12, 13] [268-D-E; 270-E-F] 3.2 It cannot be said that because of the bracketed portion in the Article 23, to the effect "or such other place as the parties may agree in writing", the seat could be elsewhere also, thus, there is not express exclusion of Part I of the Act. A bracket could not be allowed to control the main clause. Bracketed portion is only for the purposes of further explanation. The bracketed portion is meant only for the convenience of the arbitral tribunal and/or the parties for conducting the proceedings of the arbitration, but the bracketed portion does not, in any manner , change the seat of arbitration, which is only Seoul, Korea. The language is clearly indicative of the express exclusion of Part I of the Act. The advantage of bracketed portion cannot be taken.

In view of the foregoing, this appeal is allowed and the order of the Designate is set aside. The application under Show

In view of the foregoing, this appeal is allowed and the order of the Designate is set aside. The application under section 11 of the Act filed by appellant before the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court is allowed and Justice P.K.Bahri (Retd.) who was the earlier Arbitrator is appointed as the sole arbitrator to decide the appellant’s claim in regard to the additional cost for completing the work. It is open to the respondent to raise all contentions against the claim of the appellant including the contention of limitation, maintainability and res judicata, before the arbitrator. Nothing in this order shall be construed as expression of any opinion on the merits or tenability of the claim of the appellant regarding extra cost.

In light of the discussions made above we find the impugned order of the Bombay High Court unsustainable. The High Court was clearly in error not correctly following the decision of this Court in Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors and in tak..

In light of the discussions made above we find the impugned order of the Bombay High Court unsustainable. The High Court was clearly in error not correctly following the decision of this Court in Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors and in taking a contrary view. The High Court overlooked that what section 31(5) contemplates is not merely the delivery of any kind of a copy of the award but a copy of the award that is duly signed by the members of the arbitral tribunal. In the facts of the case the appellants would appear to be deriving undue advantage due to the omission of the arbitrator to give them a signed copy of the award coupled with the supply of a copy of the award to them by the claimant-respondent but that would not change the legal position and it would be wrong to tailor the law according to the facts of a particular case. In the light of the discussion made above this appeal must succeed. We, accordingly, set aside the judgments and orders passed by the Bombay High Court and the Principal District Judge, Latur. The application made by the appellants under section 34 of the Act is restored before the Principal District Judge, Latur, who shall now proceed to hear the parties on merits and pass an order on the application in accordance with law. Since the 1matter is quite old, it is hoped and expected that the Principal District Judgewill dispose this matter preferably within 6 months from the date of receipt of this order. 

In the course of arguments before us, on behalf of the appellant certain names of retired High Court Judges were indicated to the senior counsel for the Corporation for appointment as sole arbitrator but the Corporation did not agree to any of the..

In the course of arguments before us, on behalf of the appellant certain names of retired High Court Judges were indicated to the senior counsel for the Corporation for appointment as sole arbitrator but the Corporation did not agree to any of the names proposed by the appellant. In the circumstances, we are left with no choice but to send the matter back to the Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court for an appropriate order on the application made by the dealer under Section 11(6). Civil Appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned order is set aside. Arbitration Case No. 107 of 2004, M/s. Deep Trading Company 12Page 13 v. M/s. Indian Oil Corporation and others, is restored to the file of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad for fresh consideration by the Chief Justice or the designate Judge, as the case may be, in accordance with law and in light of the observations made above. No costs.

Arbitration and Concilation Act, 1996

In my considered view, the dispute has arisen between the parties and it needs to be adjudicated and decided by an Arbitrator. Consequently, I request Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.N. Variava, a former Judge of this court to accept this Arbitration ..

In my considered view, the dispute has arisen between the parties and it needs to be adjudicated and decided by an Arbitrator. Consequently, I request Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.N. Variava, a former Judge of this court to accept this Arbitration and adjudicate and decide the dispute which has arisen 10between the parties. The learned Arbitrator would be free to decide about his fee. This arbitration petition is accordingly disposed of with the direction to the parties to appear before Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.N. Variava, a former Judge of this court at 11 a.m. on 27th July, 2009 at Mumbai.  The Registry is directed to immediately communicate this order to the learned arbitrator to enable him to decide the arbitration matter as expeditiously as practicable.  Consequently, this arbitration petition is allowed and disposed of. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.

Arbitration and Concilation Act, 1996

In view of the language of Article 20 of the Arbitration Agreement which provided that the arbitration proceedings would be held in accordance with the rules and procedures of the International Chamber of Commerce or UNCITRAL, Devas was entitled t..

In view of the language of Article 20 of the Arbitration Agreement which provided that the arbitration proceedings would be held in accordance with the rules and procedures of the International Chamber of Commerce or UNCITRAL, Devas was entitled to invoke the Rules of Arbitration of the ICC for the conduct of the arbitration proceedings. Article 19 of the Agreement provided that the rights and responsibilities of the parties there under would be subject to and construed in accordance with the laws of India. There is, therefore, a clear distinction between the law which was to operate as the governing law of the Agreement and the law which was to govern the arbitration proceedings. Once the provisions of the ICC Rules of Arbitration had been invoked by Devas, Page 37the proceedings initiated there under could not be interfered with in a proceeding under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. The invocation of the ICC Rules would, of course, be subject to challenge in appropriate proceedings but not by way of an application under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act. Where the parties had agreed that the procedure for the arbitration would be governed by the ICC Rules, the same would necessarily include the appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal in terms of the Arbitration Agreement and the said Rules. Arbitration Petition No.20 of 2011 under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act for the appointment of an Arbitrator must, therefore, fail and is rejected, but this will not prevent the Petitioner from taking recourse to other provisions of the aforesaid Act for appropriate relief.

At this stage, normally the matter ought to be remitted back to the two arbitrators appointed by 67Page 68 the parties to choose the third arbitrator on the basis of the observations made in the judgment. However, given the sharp difference o..

At this stage, normally the matter ought to be remitted back to the two arbitrators appointed by 67Page 68 the parties to choose the third arbitrator on the basis of the observations made in the judgment. However, given the sharp difference of opinion between the two arbitrators, I deem it appropriate to perform the task of appointing the third arbitrator in this Court itself. Therefore, I had requested the learned senior counsel for the parties to supply a list of eminent individuals one of whom could be appointed as the third arbitrator. Although two lists have been duly supplied by the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, it would be appropriate if an individual not named by any of the parties is appointed as the third arbitrator. I have discretely conducted a survey to find a suitable third arbitrator who is not a National of any of the parties involved in the dispute. Upon due consideration, I hereby appoint Honourable James Spigelman AC QC, former Chief Justice and Lieutenant Governor of New South Wales, Australia as the third Arbitrator who shall act as the Chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal.

Arbitration and Concilation Act, 1996

Section 2 (d) of the Act defines Controlling Authority  as an authority appointed by the appropriate Government under Show

Section 2 (d) of the Act defines Controlling Authority  as an authority appointed by the appropriate Government under Section 3 of the Act. Under Section 3 the Controlling Authority is made responsible for the administration of the Act and it further provides for appointment of different authorities for different areas. Section 7 deals with for determination of the amount of gratuity. Every person who is eligible for payment of gratuity under the Act is required to send a written application to the employer in the prescribed form for payment of such gratuity. Sub-section (2) of Section 7 provides once the gratuity becomes payable, the employer shall, whether an application has been made or not, determine the amount of gratuity and give notice in 28writing to the person to whom the gratuity is payable and also to the Controlling Authority specifying the amount of gratuity so determined and arrange to pay the amount of gratuity to the person to whom the gratuity is payable. The Scheme envisaged under Section 7 of the Act, is that in case of any dispute to the amount of gratuity payable to an employee under the Act or as to the admissibility of any claim of, or in relation to, an employee payable to gratuity etc. the employer is required to deposit with the Controlling Authority the admitted amount payable as gratuity. 

Having held that the Official Liquidator had failed to discharge the duty cast on him in terms of the second proviso to Show

Having held that the Official Liquidator had failed to discharge the duty cast on him in terms of the second proviso to Section 394(1) of the Act, the next issue that requires consideration is whether sanction of a scheme of amalgamation can be held up merely because the conduct of an Official Liquidator is found to be blameworthy? We are of the view that it will neither be proper nor feasible to lay down absolute parameters in this behalf. The effect of misdemeanor on the part of the official liquidator on the scheme as such would depend on the facts obtaining in each case and ordinarily the Company Judge should be the final arbiter on that issue. In the instant case, indubitably, the findings in the report under Section 209A of the Act were placed before the Company Judge, and he had considered the same while sanctioning the scheme of amalgamation. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the Company Judge had, before him, all material facts which had a direct bearing on the sanction of the amalgamation scheme, despite the afore stated lapse on the part of the Official Liquidator. In this view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the Company Judge, having examined all material facts, was justified in sanctioning the scheme of amalgamation, particularly when the current investigation under Section 235 of the Act was initiated pursuant to a complaint filed by respondent 3No.1 subsequent to the order of the Company Judge sanctioning the scheme. For the foregoing reasons, the appeals are allowed; and the impugned judgment is set aside. Consequently, the order passed by the Company Judge sanctioning the scheme of amalgamation is restored. However, it is made clear that the scheme of amalgamation will not come in the way of any civil or criminal proceedings which may arise pursuant to the action initiated under Sections 209A or 235 of the Act, or any criminal proceedings filed by respondent No. 1. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. 

On an overall analysis of the facts involved and the part played by the Petitioner No.2 in the affairs of the Company at the relevant time, we are not inclined to interfere with the orders of the High Court or the Company Law Board, since we are n..

On an overall analysis of the facts involved and the part played by the Petitioner No.2 in the affairs of the Company at the relevant time, we are not inclined to interfere with the orders of the High Court or the Company Law Board, since we are not satisfied that any act of oppression or mismanagement within the meaning of Sections 397, 398, 402 and 403 of the Companies Act, 1956, has been made out by the Petitioners against the majority shareholders of the Respondent No.1 Company which would justify the making of a winding 39up order on the ground that it would be just and equitable to do so and to pass appropriate orders to bring to an end the matters complained of. The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. 

When we consider the facts of the present case bearing in mind the definition aforesaid, we find that the contract in question is not a spot delivery contract. True it is that by letter dated 30th of October, 1987 written by Tuhin to Bhagwati, he ..

When we consider the facts of the present case bearing in mind the definition aforesaid, we find that the contract in question is not a spot delivery contract. True it is that by letter dated 30th of October, 1987 written by Tuhin to Bhagwati, he had stated that the formal agreement had been executed between them on 10th November, 1986 and as per the agreement he is transferring the entire 3530 shares of Peerless purchased from the loan amount and the transfer is in its repayment. However, the agreement dated 21st November, 1994 between Bhagwati and Tuhin which formed part of the compromise decree provides that the sale of shares took place on 30th October, 1987 and in 32Page 33consideration thereof Bhagwati paid a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs on 21st November, 1994 and further the dividend on the entire shares up to the accounting year 1989-90 amounting to Rs.8,64,850 to be retained by Tuhin. In the face of it, the plea of Bhagwati that the payment of Rs. 10 lakh was made to buy peace, is not fit to be accepted and in fact, that forms part of the consideration for the sale of shares. Once we take this view, the plea of the appellant that it is a spot delivery contract is fit to be rejected. We agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the Company Law Board and the High Court on this issue.

We are constrained to observe that criminal justice system is not working in our country as it should. The police reforms have not taken place despite directions of this Court in the case of Prakash Singh & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. W..

We are constrained to observe that criminal justice system is not working in our country as it should. The police reforms have not taken place despite directions of this Court in the case of Prakash Singh & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. We do not intend to say anything more in this regard since matter is being dealt with separately by a 3-Judge Bench. The investigators hardly have professional orientation; they do not have modern tools. On many occasions impartial investigation suffers because of political interference. The criminal trials are protracted because of non-appearance of official witnesses on time and the non-availability of the facilities for recording evidence by video conferencing. The public prosecutors have their limitations; the defence lawyers do not make themselves available and the court would be routinely informed about their pre-occupation with other matters; the courts remain over burdened with the briefs listed on the day and they do not have adequate infrastructure. The adjournments thus become routine; the casualty is justice. It is imperative that the criminal cases relating to offences against the State, corruption, dowry death, domestic violence, sexual assault, financial fraud and cyber crimes are fast tracked and decided in a fixed time frame, preferably, of three years including the appeal provisions. It is high time that immediate and urgent steps are taken in amending the procedural and other laws to achieve the above objectives. We must remember that a strong and efficient criminal justice system is a guarantee to the rule of law and vibrant civil society.

Indian Penal Code, 1860

 Taking into account the complexities involved in this case, on account of a hiatus created by reason of the law not being brought into force in time, we are of the view that the first appeals, filed by respondent no.3 in the High Court being..

 Taking into account the complexities involved in this case, on account of a hiatus created by reason of the law not being brought into force in time, we are of the view that the first appeals, filed by respondent no.3 in the High Court being FAO No.292/06 and FAO No.293/06, would remain in the High Court. The said appeals would be heard and disposed of by the High Court in accordance with law under Section 116 of the said 1970 Act as it stood on 19.10.06. The High Court will hear and decide the validity of the Order passed by the Controller dated 23.8.06 rejecting “pre-grant opposition” filed by respondent no.3. We are informed that there are hardly one or two matters of this nature which are pending. Therefore, we are of the view that respondent no.3 cannot be let without remedy. In the special circumstances of this case, particularly when after 2.4.07 appeals against orders rejecting “pre-grant opposition” are not maintainable and particularly when FAO No.292/06 and FAO No.293/06 were filed by respondent no.3 prior to 2.4.07 under the old law, we are of the view that these two appeals shall be heard and decided by the High Court in accordance with law. The Appellate Board 27after 2.4.07 is entitled to hear appeals only arising from orders passed by the Controller under Section 25(4), i.e., in cases of orders passed in “post-grant opposition”. Therefore, there is no point in transferring the pending FAO No.292/06 and FAO No.293/06 to the Appellate Board which has no authority to decide matters concerning “pre-grant opposition”. Moreover, it may be noted that even Section 117G, which refers to transfer of pending proceedings to the Appellate Board, is also brought into force vide Notification dated 3.4.07. Keeping in mind the peculiar nature of the problem in hand, we are of theview that ends of justice would be subserved if the High Court is directed to hear and decide the appeals bearing FAO No.292/06 and FAO No.293/06 in accordance with law as it then stood, i.e., under Section 116 under Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999 against Orders passed by the Controller in “pre-grant opposition” proceedings.

In view of the above, we dispose of the contempt petition giving liberty to the applicant to approach the appropriate court/forum for seeking custody of the child, Kislay, or any other appropriate relief in this regard. In case, such a petition is..

In view of the above, we dispose of the contempt petition giving liberty to the applicant to approach the appropriate court/forum for seeking custody of the child, Kislay, or any other appropriate relief in this regard. In case, such a petition is filed, the court concerned is requested to proceed and dispose of the same in accordance with law, without being influenced by the consent order dated 3.5.2008 or dismissal order of the writ petition dated 29.9.2009 passed by this Court regarding the custody and visiting rights of the parties towards the child, most expeditiously. Needless to say that the court concerned would proceed with the case, if any, without taking note of any observation made hereinabove in this judgment as we have expressed no opinion on merit on the issue of custody.

Contempt of Court Act, 1971

In the case in hand on taking into account all the circumstances as discussed above, we are of the view that it would not be wholly reasonable to hold that the respondent withdrew large amounts from his account with Pictet in violation of this Cou..

In the case in hand on taking into account all the circumstances as discussed above, we are of the view that it would not be wholly reasonable to hold that the respondent withdrew large amounts from his account with Pictet in violation of this Court’s orders. For the reasons discussed above, we hold that the respondent cannot be held guilty of contempt. Coming back to the order, dated April 1, 2010 by which this Court held that the respondent had withdrawn money from his account with Pictet by flouting the orders of this Court, it is to be noted that that order is founded on the premise that the respondent had not denied the allegation made by the petitioner against him. It is, however, to be noted that the respondent in his reply to the contempt petition filed on March 3, 2010 had stated in paragraph 2 (XIV) as under: “The Respondent takes liberty for reiterating that he has not withdrawn any amount in spite of (sic.) the order passed by this Hon’ble Court.” The order dated April 1, 2010, was, thus, clearly based on an erroneous premise of fact. It is, accordingly, recalled. For the reasons discussed above, we find no merit in the contempt petition. It is dismissed

We are of the opinion that a broad and expansive interpretation should be given to the term ‘wife’ to include even those cases where a man and woman have been living together as husband and wife for a reasonably long period of time, an..

We are of the opinion that a broad and expansive interpretation should be given to the term ‘wife’ to include even those cases where a man and woman have been living together as husband and wife for a reasonably long period of time, and strict proof of marriage should not be a pre-condition for maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C, so as to fulfil the true spirit and essence of the beneficial provision of maintenance under Section 125. We also believe that such an interpretation would be a just application of the principles enshrined in the Preamble to our Constitution, namely, social justice and upholding the dignity of the individual.

The High Court, in our opinion, without getting the matter enquired into could not have opined that it was a clear cut case of sexual harassment of the writ petitioner and on that basis directed initiation of a disciplinary action in the manner as..

The High Court, in our opinion, without getting the matter enquired into could not have opined that it was a clear cut case of sexual harassment of the writ petitioner and on that basis directed initiation of a disciplinary action in the manner as has been done in paragraph 8 noticed (supra).  We, in modification, of the order passed by the High Court direct that as no complaint committee has been constituted, which was imperative in character, the High Court may appoint a Three Members Committee headed by a Lady and in the event it is found that the writ petitioner was subjected to sexual harassment, the report thereof may be sent to the army authorities for initiation of a disciplinary action against the appellants herein on the basis thereof. All the expenditures which may be incurred in this behalf may be borne by the Army Authorities.

Constitution of India, 1951

Coming back to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court and the learned Family Court Judge erred in law in 1holding that the appellant was not married to Lakshmi without even issuing notice to Lakshmi. Hence this fi..

Coming back to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court and the learned Family Court Judge erred in law in 1holding that the appellant was not married to Lakshmi without even issuing notice to Lakshmi. Hence this finding has to be set aside and the matter remanded to the Family Court which may issue notice to Lakshmi and after hearing her give a fresh finding in accordance with law. The question whether the appellant was married to the respondent or not can, of course, be decided only after the aforesaid finding. There is also no finding in the judgment of the learned Family Court Judge on the question whether the appellant and respondent had lived together for a reasonably long period of time in a relationship which was in the nature of marriage. In our opinion such findings were essential to decide this case. Hence we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and Family Court Judge, Coimbatore and remand the matter to the Family Court Judge to decide the matter afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. Appeals allowed. 

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

It is true that the expression “female” has not been used in the proviso to Show

It is true that the expression “female” has not been used in the proviso to Section 2(q) also, but, on the other hand, if the Legislature intended to exclude females from the ambit of the complaint, which can be filed by an aggrieved wife, females would have been specifically excluded, instead of it being provided in the proviso that a complaint could also be filed against a relative of the husband or the male partner. No restrictive meaning has been given to the expression 12“relative”, nor has the said expression been specifically defined in the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, to make it specific to males only.  In such circumstances, it is clear that the legislature never intended to exclude female relatives of the husband or male partner from the ambit of a complaint that can be made under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. In our view, both the Sessions Judge and the High Court went wrong in holding otherwise, possibly being influenced by the definition of the expression “respondent” in the main body of Section 2(q) of the aforesaid Act. The Appeal, therefore, succeeds. The judgments and orders, both of the learned Sessions Judge, Amravati, dated 15th July, 2009 and the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court dated 5th March, 2010, in Crl. Writ Petition No.588 of 2009 are set 13aside. Consequently, the trial Court shall also proceed against the said Respondent Nos.2 and 3 on the complaint filed by the Appellant.

In R.L. Gupta v. Jupitor General Insurance Co. [1990(1) SCC 356] it was held the quantum of liability is provided by the Statute prospectively. At the relevant point of time the quantum of Rs.15,000/- appears to have been paid. The High Court&rsqu..

In R.L. Gupta v. Jupitor General Insurance Co. [1990(1) SCC 356] it was held the quantum of liability is provided by the Statute prospectively. At the relevant point of time the quantum of Rs.15,000/- appears to have been paid. The High Court’s view about retrospective operation is contrary 3to what has been stated in R.L. Gupta’s case (supra). In any event, Act can have no application in respect of a claim  petition filed on 30.11.1982 and decided by MACT on 16.7.1984.  Above being the position the appeal deserves to be allowed, which we direct. The amount shall be Rs.15,000/- instead of Rs.50,000/- asdirected by the Tribunal. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. 

Motor Vehicle Act, 1988

We have examined the aforesaid discrepancies pointed out by the learned counsel. It may be stated herein that some of the issues have been explained by the prosecution, however, no attempt was ever made by the defence to put most of these issues t..

We have examined the aforesaid discrepancies pointed out by the learned counsel. It may be stated herein that some of the issues have been explained by the prosecution, however, no attempt was ever made by the defence to put most of these issues to SI Vinod Kumar (PW.20), the Investigating Officer in his cross-examination. It is evident from his deposition that he had, in fact, answered all the questions that were put to him in the cross-examination. However, it is pertinent to clarify that most of these questions that are being currently raised before us were not put to him. For example, he has explained that nobody from the said market had been ready to become the Panch witness for recovery of the mobile phone from Sonu’s shop at Itarsi, and that even Sonu was not ready to do so. Further, no question had been put to him in the cross-examination regarding the different EMEI number of the said mobile phone. The mobile phone that was recovered, bore the EMEI No. 3534000004033852 (Ex.P-19), though the EMEI number of mobile phone that belonged to Sonia was 3534000004033853. Furthermore, no question had been put as to why the mobile phone, after the recovery, had not been deposited in the Malkhana. In light of such a fact situation, it is not permissible for us to consider such discrepancies. 

In our opinion, this was a completely incorrect direction particularly because way back in 1982, plan No.1/75 was treated as cancelled and there was no revival of that plan. 2026. Last but not the least, respondent No.1 herein, Karpaga Nagar Nala ..

In our opinion, this was a completely incorrect direction particularly because way back in 1982, plan No.1/75 was treated as cancelled and there was no revival of that plan. 2026. Last but not the least, respondent No.1 herein, Karpaga Nagar Nala Urimai Sangam represented by Shri A. Shamugavel had filed an Original Suit No.1106/86 in the Court of Additional District Munsif Court, Madurai Town in his capacity as a resident of Karpaga Nagar Colony wherein he had sought for an injunction restraining the Trust from selling or using the property for any purpose than the purpose for which it was reserved in LP MR 1/75. For all these reasons, we cannot affirm the judgment of the High Court. It is set aside and the Writ Petition filed by the respondent is directed to be dismissed with costs of Rs.50,000/

we set aside the judgment and order of the High Court as also the First Appellate Court and restore the judgment and order of the Trial Court which had been pleased to dismiss the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondents No.1 to 7. The Trial Court,..

we set aside the judgment and order of the High Court as also the First Appellate Court and restore the judgment and order of the Trial Court which had been pleased to dismiss the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondents No.1 to 7. The Trial Court, however, had decreed the suit for return of the money of Rs.17,500/- to the predecessor of respondents No.1 to 7 and also interest was ordered to be paid on this amount by the vendor-respondent No.8. Since the respondent No.8 had already been divested of his title to execute a sale deed in favour of respondent Nos.1 to 7 as he had already executed a deed of gift in favour of the appellant-trust for charitable purpose, we are of the view that in the interest of equity, he should not be saddled with the financial liability to return the amount of Rs.17,500/- with interest to the respondent Nos.1-7. This amount, in our view, in the interest of equity 2and fair play should be paid by the appellant-trust to the respondent Nos.1-7 on behalf of Respondent No.8, as this part of the decree which had been passed by the Trial Court in favour of respondent Nos. 1-7 had not been challenged by way of an appeal by the respondent No.8. But as we have held that the appellant-trust is the rightful owner of the disputed plot and the Respondent No.8 as a consequence has been held to have been divested of the property, the amount paid by the predecessor of Respondent Nos.1-7, should be refunded to Respondent Nos.1-7 without interest and thus the decree of the Trial Court shall be treated as modified to this extent. This appeal accordingly is allowed, without any order as to costs.

In the present case, the person who was called to prove the document himself said that he had not signed as an identifying witness in respect of Ext. B2 and moreover he stated that he did not know about the signature in Ex. B2. The contents of the..

In the present case, the person who was called to prove the document himself said that he had not signed as an identifying witness in respect of Ext. B2 and moreover he stated that he did not know about the signature in Ex. B2. The contents of the document were not proved as was required to be done. Taking all the factors as stated hereinbefore into consideration and also noticing the fact that execution of the Will, which was executed on the same day as that of the Gift Deed, we hold that even the said document is found to be of suspicious nature and therefore the said deed is also held to be not duly proved. .Consequently, no interference is called for to the findings recorded by both the appellate courts below to the effect that the appellant has failed to prove that the said deed of gift was executed by deceased Chathu. That apart both the appellate courts below have found that both the documents namely the Deed of Gift as also Deed of Will suffer from suspicious circumstances. The said findings are concurrent findings of fact which should not be normally interfered with by the Court by exercising the power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

(1) The appellant is not a bona fide purchaser and is, therefore, not protected against specific performance of the contract between the plaintiffs and the owner defendants in the suit. (2) The transfer in favour of the appellant pendente lite is ..

(1) The appellant is not a bona fide purchaser and is, therefore, not protected against specific performance of the contract between the plaintiffs and the owner defendants in the suit. (2) The transfer in favour of the appellant pendente lite is effective in transferring title to the appellant but such title shall remain subservient to the rights of the plaintiff in the suit and subject to any direction which the Court may eventually pass therein. Since the appellant has purchased the entire estate that forms the subject matter of the suit, the appellant is entitled to be added as a party defendant to the suit. (4) The appellant shall as a result of his addition raise and pursue only such defenses as were available and taken by the original defendants and none other With the above additions, I agree with the order proposed by my Esteemed Brother, M.Y. Eqbal, J. that this 
appeal be allowed and the appellant added as party defendant to the suit in question. 

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. In our considered opinion, the learned single judge has completely misconstrued the provisions of Show

We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. In our considered opinion, the learned single judge has completely misconstrued the provisions of Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC and has committed serious error in deciding the scope of Section 53A of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and Order 2 Rule 2 of CPC. As noticed above the Civil Judge while granting ad-interim injunction very categorically observed in the order that respective rights of the parties shall be decided at the time of final disposal of the suit. The very fact that Plaintiff No.2 is in possession of the property as a tenant under Plaintiff No.1 and possession of Plaintiff No.2 was not denied, the interim protection was given to Plaintiff No.2 against the threatened action of the defendants to evict her without following the 5Page 6 due process of law. In our considered opinion, the order passed by the learned single judge cannot be sustained in law. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow this appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court in the aforesaid appeal arising out of the order of injunction. However, before parting with the order we are of the view that since the suit is pending for a long time the trial court shall hear and dispose of the suit within a period of four months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. It goes without saying that the trial court shall not be influenced by any of the observation made in the order passed by the appellate court as also by this court and the suit shall be decided on its own merits. 

We have elaborately discussed the various legal principles and indicated that the expression ‘licensee’ in Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act would take a gratuitous licensee as well. The reason for such an interpretation h..

We have elaborately discussed the various legal principles and indicated that the expression ‘licensee’ in Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act would take a gratuitous licensee as well. The reason for such an interpretation has been elaborately discussed in the earlier part of the judgment. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the reasoning of the Full Bench of the High Court. In such  circumstances, the appeals lack merits and are, therefore, dismissed. There is no order as to costs.

In this case, we are satisfied that in the interests of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of court, the trial court ought to have considered whether it was necessary to re-open the evidence and if so, in what manner and to what extent fu..

In this case, we are satisfied that in the interests of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of court, the trial court ought to have considered whether it was necessary to re-open the evidence and if so, in what manner and to what extent further evidence should be permitted in exercise of its power under Section 151 of the Code. The court ought to have also considered whether it should straightway recall PW1 and PW2 and permit the Appellant to confront the said recorded evidence to the said witnesses or whether it should first receive such evidence by requiring its proof of its authenticity and only then permit it to be confronted to the witnesses (PW1 and PW2). In view of the above, these appeals are allowed in part. The orders of the High Court and Trial Court dismissing IA No. 216/2009 under Section 151of the Code are set aside. The orders are affirmed in regard to the dismissal of IA No. 217/2009 under Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code. The trial court shall now consider IA No. 216/2009 afresh in accordance with law.

Information Technology Act, 2000 &  Indian Evidence Act, 1872

On the question of sentence we are satisfied that the extreme depravity with which the offences were committed and the merciless manner in which death was inflicted on the victim, brings it within the category of rarest of rare cases which merits ..

On the question of sentence we are satisfied that the extreme depravity with which the offences were committed and the merciless manner in which death was inflicted on the victim, brings it within the category of rarest of rare cases which merits the death penalty, as awarded by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court. None of the mitigating factors as were indicated by this Court in Bachan Singh’s case (supra) or in Machhi Singh’s case (supra) are present in the facts of the instant case. The appellant even made up a story as to his presence in the house on seeing P.W.2 Suresh, who had come there in the meantime. Apart from the above, it is clear from the recoveries made from his house that this was not the first time that he had committed crimes in other premises 66also, before he was finally caught by the public two days after the present incident, while trying to escape from the house of one Seeba where he made a similar attempt to rob and assault her and in the process causing injuries to her. As has been indicated by the Courts below, the antecedents of the appellant and his subsequent conduct indicates that he is a menace to society and is incapable of rehabilitation. The offences committed by the appellant were neither under duress nor on provocation and an innocent life was snuffed out by him after committing violent rape on the victim. He did not feel any remorse in regard to his actions, inasmuch as, within two days of the incident he was caught by the local public while committing an offence of a similar type in the house of one Seeba.

Indian Penal Code, 1860

The facts are that Rathnamma herself stated in her evidence that she had sex with the appellant on several occasions. It is also an admitted fact that the FIR against the appellant was lodged just a few days before the birth of Rathnamma’s c..

The facts are that Rathnamma herself stated in her evidence that she had sex with the appellant on several occasions. It is also an admitted fact that the FIR against the appellant was lodged just a few days before the birth of Rathnamma’s child, which means there is delay of over 8 months in lodging the FIR. The finding of the trial court, which has not been disturbed by the High Court, is that Rathnamma was about 18 years of age at the relevant time. On these facts a view is reasonably possible that Rathnamma had sex with the appellant with her consent and hence there was 4no offence under Section 376 IPC because sex with a woman above 16 years of age with her consent is not rape.  For the reasons given above, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the High court is set aside Apart from the above, the appellant has stated in an affidavit filed in this Court that he has agreed to transfer two acres of land situated in Palavanahalli due to breach of promise to marry Rathnamma and she has given her consent to accept the same. The appellant is directed to give/transfer two acres of land as stated in the affidavit filed before Court to Rathnamma within three months from the date of this judgment.  

The trial court as well as the High Court should have appreciated the evidence on record with regard to delay and not giving proper explanation regarding delay of 11 days in filing FIR by the prosecutrix and non-examination of complainant witnesse..

The trial court as well as the High Court should have appreciated the evidence on record with regard to delay and not giving proper explanation regarding delay of 11 days in filing FIR by the prosecutrix and non-examination of complainant witnesses, viz. the Doctor and the I.O. which has not only caused prejudice to the case of the appellant but also the case of prosecution has created reasonable doubt in the mind of this Court. Therefore, the benefit of doubt must enure to the appellant. As we have stated above the testimony of the prosecutrix is most unnatural and improbable to believe and therefore it does not inspire confidence for acceptance of the same for sustaining the conviction and sentence. Therefore, we are of the view that the impugned judgment requires to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction. Accordingly, we Page 25 allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment.  If the appellant has executed the bail bonds, the same may be discharged.

Indian Penal Code, 1860

It is to be borne in mind that suspicion pertaining to fidelity has immense potentiality to commit irreversible wrongs as it corrupts the mind and corrodes the sense of rational thinking and further allows liberty to the mind to pave the path of e..

It is to be borne in mind that suspicion pertaining to fidelity has immense potentiality to commit irreversible wrongs as it corrupts the mind and corrodes the sense of rational thinking and further allows liberty to the mind to pave the path of evil. In fact, it brings in baseness. It quite often impures mind, takes it to the devil’s den and leads one to do unjust acts than just deeds. In any case, it does not give licence to commit murder. Thus, the submission pertaining to the absence of motive has no substance.  In view of the aforesaid analysis, we conclude and hold that all the links in the chain of evidence are established beyond reasonable doubt and the established circumstances are consistent with the singular hypothesis that the accused is guilty of the crime and it is totally inconsistent with his innocence. We have said so on the basis of the pronouncements 19Page 20 in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra , Padala Veera Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and ors., Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, Harischandra Ladaku Thange v. State of Maharashtra  and Jagroop Singh v. State of Punjab. Consequently, the appeal, being sans substratum, stands dismissed. 

Indian Penal Code, 1860

When we Criminal Appeal No.2260 of 2009 7 of 9Page 8 consider the submission of the learned counsel about the abnormal delay in proceeding against the appellant up to the alleged date of occurrence, the trial Court has also held that the witn..

When we Criminal Appeal No.2260 of 2009 7 of 9Page 8 consider the submission of the learned counsel about the abnormal delay in proceeding against the appellant up to the alleged date of occurrence, the trial Court has also held that the witnesses were all of rural background and illiterate persons and, therefore, some allowance will have to be given for their laxity in bringing the factum of the rape alleged to have been committed by the appellant on the deceased Radha Bai. When we consider the evidence of PW-5, who was a child witness, who was stated to be between 13 to 14 years at the time of occurrence, we find that his evidence was found to be natural and he withstood the lengthy cross-examination, which did not bring out any contradiction in his version apart from the fact that he had no axe to grind against the appellant. Further when based on the evidence of PW 5 and the medical reports, the incriminating circumstances that existed against the appellant were put in 313 questioning, he had no explanation to offer. The medical evidence also fully supported the crime alleged against the appellant. Moreover, the evidence of PW-7, also corroborated the version of PW-5 to considerable extent regarding the Criminal Appeal No.2260 of 2009 8 of 9Page 9involvement of the appellant in the commission of the crime on the deceased Radha Bai. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion of guilt found proved against the appellant as held by the trial Court as well as the High Court cannot be faulted. Having regard to our above conclusion, we do not find any merit in the appeal. The appeal fails and the same is dismissed. The appellant is on bail. The bail bond stands cancelled and he shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the remaining part of sentence, if any.

Indian Penal Code, 1860

In view of International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 1966; United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 1985, rape survivors are entitled to legal recourse that does not re..

In view of International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 1966; United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 1985, rape survivors are entitled to legal recourse that does not retraumatize them or violate their physical or mental integrity and dignity. They are also entitled to medical procedures conducted in a manner that respects their right to consent. Medical procedures should not be carried out in a manner that constitutes cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and health should be of paramount consideration while dealing with gender-based violence. The State is under an obligation to make such services available to survivors of sexual violence. Proper measures Page 10 should be taken to ensure their safety and there should be no arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy. Thus, in view of the above, undoubtedly, the two finger test and its interpretation violates the right of rape survivors to privacy, physical and mental integrity and dignity. Thus, this test, even if the report is affirmative, cannot ipso facto, be given rise to presumption of consent. In view of the above, the facts and circumstances of the case do not present special features warranting any interference by this Court. The appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.

Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Court stated that we must take into consideration that Ramesh who was convicted and awarded the death sentence by the learned Sessions Judge in 2004 is languishing in death cell for more than six years. This also would be one of the mitigating cir..

Court stated that we must take into consideration that Ramesh who was convicted and awarded the death sentence by the learned Sessions Judge in 2004 is languishing in death cell for more than six years. This also would be one of the mitigating circumstances.  In short, we are of the opinion that the death sentence awarded to Ramesh would not be justified and instead we would modify the same to life imprisonment. However, convictions for the other offences as also sentences awarded are confirmed. All the three appeals are accordingly dismissed with the modifications of sentence in Criminal Appeal No.1236 of 2006 filed by Ramesh.

Indian Penal Code, 1860

The learned Single Judge has also rightly supported the decision of the Sessions Judge in holding that the material on record was insufficient to even prima facie indicate the complicity of Sangeeta in the alleged offences of cruelty and abetment ..

The learned Single Judge has also rightly supported the decision of the Sessions Judge in holding that the material on record was insufficient to even prima facie indicate the complicity of Sangeeta in the alleged offences of cruelty and abetment of suicide. We entirely agree with the conclusion arrived in the impugned Order to the effect that a prima facie case justifying the trial of the Lajja Shankar, Meera and Sherish have been established and that the Sessions Judge erred in discharging these three persons. Accordingly, the appeals fail and are dismissed being devoid of merits. We would have imposed exemplary costs on the Appellants in these proceedings but for the fact that the impugned Order reverses the order passed by the Sessions Court. In other words if we had been confronted with concurrent findings punitive costs would have followed

It has come out in evidence that the deceased was suffering from Epilepsy for the last three years i.e. before 15.3.1993, the date of incident. This fact is fortified by the evidence of Dr. Kuldeep, who was examined as DW1. He deposed that the dec..

It has come out in evidence that the deceased was suffering from Epilepsy for the last three years i.e. before 15.3.1993, the date of incident. This fact is fortified by the evidence of Dr. Kuldeep, who was examined as DW1. He deposed that the deceased was suffering from Epilepsy and was under his treatment from 23.12.1992 to 2.4.1993 at Kuldeep Hospital, Ambala City. His evidence was brushed aside by the trial Court on the ground that Dr. Kuldeep was not a Psychiatrist. It may be noted that Epilepsy is not a Psychiatrist problem. It is a disease of nerves system and a MD (Medicine) could treat the patient of Epilepsy. The reasoning given by the trial Court for brushing aside the evidence of DW1 cannot be sustained. Therefore, the possibility of an accidental death, since she was suffering from Epilepsy, cannot Page 2626be ruled out. Evidently, she was in the kitchen and, might be, during cooking she might have suffered Epileptic symptoms and fell down on the gas stove and might have caught fire, resulting her ultimate death. - DW2, ASI Ram Mohan, the Investigating Officer of the case, deposed that he had recorded the statements of the deceased wherein she had stated that she was suffering from Epilepsy for the last three years before the incident and that on 15.9.1993 while she was preparing meals on stove, she had an attack of fits and fell on the stove and caught fire. She had also deposed at that time that her husband was away at duty at Madhuban, Karnal. In our view, the evidence of DW2 has to be appreciated in the light of overall facts and circumstances of the case. 

Code of Criminal Prcedure, 1973

Indian Penal Code, 1860

From the evidence of record available before us, we find that the prosecution witnesses have in their testimonies stated that the deceased was tortured both physically and mentally by the appellant for the first time after his marriage with the de..

From the evidence of record available before us, we find that the prosecution witnesses have in their testimonies stated that the deceased was tortured both physically and mentally by the appellant for the first time after his marriage with the deceased when he was refused permission for marriage with said Anita by the deceased. On having been refused the permission for his second marriage with Anita, the appellant 14again, after a few days requested the deceased to accede to his request for marriage with Anita, which request was again refused by the deceased. Consequent to the said position and due to the adamant position taken by the deceased, cruelty was meted out to her by the accused which fact is sufficiently proved from the evidence on record. Therefore, we find no reason to take a different view than what has been taken by the trial Court and the High Court as far as Section 498A IPC is concerned. Accordingly, the present appeal is hereby partly allowed. We hereby set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 306 but uphold the conviction of the appellant under section 498A. As the appellant is on bail, his bail bonds stand cancelled. The appellant is directed to surrender himself before the jail authorities within 15 days from today to serve out the remaining sentence under Section 498A, failing which the concerned authority shall proceed against the appellant in accordance with law.

It is only in extreme circumstances that a woman may decide to take her life and that of her unborn child when she reaches a point of no return and is in a mental state to take her own life. In the instant case, there is no reason to disbelieve ei..

It is only in extreme circumstances that a woman may decide to take her life and that of her unborn child when she reaches a point of no return and is in a mental state to take her own life. In the instant case, there is no reason to disbelieve either P.W.9, Naib Tahsildar and Executive Magistrate, or P.W.11, who attended to the victim in the hospital. [Para 18] [722-d-f] 1.2. A dying declaration has to be treated with caution, since the accused does not get a chance to cross-examine the victim. In this case, however, there is no ambiguity or irregularity as far as the dying declaration is concerned and it has been stated in clear and simple language that the victim had been treated with both mental and physical cruelty and the victim has stated quite candidly how she poured kerosene on her body and set herself on fire. The evidence of P.W.13, the younger brother of the deceased, corroborates the story of the prosecution as to the manner in which deceased was treated by the petitioner, which triggered her immediate intention to commit suicide which was the culminating point of ill- treatment meted out to her by the petitioner and his mother. [Para 18] [722-H; 723-A-B] 1.3. The element of instigation as understood within the meaning of Section 107 IPC is duly satisfied in this case in view of the provisions of Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which provides for a presumption to be arrived at egarding abetment of suicide by a married woman and certain criteria are also laid down therein. 

The High Court has recorded a firm finding that the harassment was not for or in connection with any de AND s for dowry. But, at the same time, the High Court has concluded that the wife committed suicide due to the harassment of the app..

The High Court has recorded a firm finding that the harassment was not for or in connection with any de AND s for dowry. But, at the same time, the High Court has concluded that the wife committed suicide due to the harassment of the appellant, in particular. The deceased had committed suicide by drinking Organo Phosphorus poison. In such circumstances, the High Court was, therefore, fully justified in convicting the appellant u/s 306 IPC. [para 9-10] [118-E-H; 119-A-D] 2.1. It cannot be said that the appellant could not have been convicted u/s 306 IPC in the absence of a charge being framed against him under the said section. Both the trial court AND the High Court have held that the deceased had committed suicide. Therefore, the nature of the offence u/s 304-B AND 306 IPC are not distinct AND different categories. Mere omission or defect in framing charge would not disable the court from convicting the accused for the offence which has been found to be proved on the basis of the evidence on record. In such circumstances, the matter would fall within the purview of ss. 221 (1) AND (2) Cr.P.C. The High Court upon meticulous scrutiny of the entire evidence on record rightly concluded that there was no evidence to indicate the commission of the offence punishable u/s 304-B IPC. It was also observed that the deceased had committed suicide due to harassment meted out to her by the appellant but there was no evidence on record to suggest that such harassment or cruelty was made in connection to any dowry de AND s. Thus, cruelty or harassment sans any dowry de AND s which drives the wife to commit suicide attracts the offence of `abetment of suicide' u/s 306 IPC AND not s. 304-B IPC which defines the offence AND punishment for `dowry death'. 

Court found that the wilful conduct referred to above should be of such a nature as would provoke a person of common prudence to commit suicide and a difference of opinion within a family on everyday mundane matters would not fall within that cate..

Court found that the wilful conduct referred to above should be of such a nature as would provoke a person of common prudence to commit suicide and a difference of opinion within a family on everyday mundane matters would not fall within that category. We find that merely because the appellants were of the opinion that the deceased, as a good daughter-in-law, should look after them in old age could not be said to an abetment of suicide. The presumption against the appellants raised under Section 113A of the Evidence Act, 1872 cannot thus be drawn. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court's judgment suffers from serious contradictions. We, accordingly, allow this appeal and set aside the conviction of the appellants before us. Their bail bonds be discharged.

In the instant case, it is not the case of the prosecution that the appellant had subjected the deceased to cruelty of the nature described in clause (b) of Explanation to s.Show

In the instant case, it is not the case of the prosecution that the appellant had subjected the deceased to cruelty of the nature described in clause (b) of Explanation to s.498A, IPC, as there is no allegation that the appellant had harassed her with a view to coerce her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or that he subjected her to harassment on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. [para 8] 1.3 As regards Clause (a) of the Explanation to s. 498A, the High Court has relied on Ext. 47 i.e. a written undertaking dated 13.4.1988 given by appellant to give equal treatment to both his wives. Exts. 47 is an evidence of some misbehaviour of the appellant towards the deceased but the nature of the misbehaviour has not been stated in it. Besides, the drowning of the deceased took place three months after Ext. 47 had been execuited. For holding the appellant guilty of the offences u/s 306 and 498A, IPC, there must be evidence of wilful conduct of the appellant towards the deceased soon before her death which could have driven her to commit suicide. The post mortem examination report of deceased described her as `well nourished' and the last meal was taken by her within six hours. Moreover, the post mortem examination report does not show that the deceased was subjected to any severe beating before her death. [para 11and 13] 1.4 Thus, the prosecution has not been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of any wilful conduct which was of such a nature as was likely to drive the deceased to commit suicide. Rather, there appears to be some evidence in the depositions of PW-1 and PW-4 (father and sister of the deceased) that the deceased was sad due to a daughter being born to her and a son being born to the first wife of the appellant. These circumstances may have driven her to commit suicide by jumping into the well along with her daughter. Such a consequence from the mental state of the deceased cannot be a ground for holding the appellant guilty of cruelty within the meaning of clause (a) of the Explanation to s.498A, IPC. Therefore, the presumption u/s 113A is not attracted and the appellant cannot also be held guilty of abetting the suicide of the deceased.

It must be remembered that the first duty of the Court is to do justice. Courts must endeavour to find the truth and that there would be failure of justice not only by an unjust conviction but also by acquittal of the guilty for unjustified failur..

It must be remembered that the first duty of the Court is to do justice. Courts must endeavour to find the truth and that there would be failure of justice not only by an unjust conviction but also by acquittal of the guilty for unjustified failure to produce available evidence. Of course the rights of the accused have to be kept in mind and safeguarded, but they should not be over emphasized to the extent of forgetting that the victims also have rights. [255-A, B] Sri Krishna Gobe v. Stale of Maharashtra, [1973] 4 SCC 23, relied on. 1.4. It must also be remembered that the Criminal Procedure Code is an ongoing statute. The principles of interpreting an ongoing statute have been very succinctly set out by the jurists and referred by Courts in number of cases. The apex Court has approved the principle of updating construction as enunciated by Francis Bennion, in a number of decisions. However, it is well settled law that the doctrine "Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimm" has no application when interpreting a provision of an ongoing statute. [255-C; 256-E; 257-D] National Textile Workers' Union v. P.R. Ramakrishnan, [1983] 1 SCC 228; Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v. M/s. Podar Cement Pvt. Ltd., [1997] 5 SCC 482; State v. S.J. Chowdhury, [1996] 2 SCC 428; SIL Import USA v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters, [1999] 4 SCC 567 and Basavaraj R. Patil v. State of Karnataka, [2000] 8 SCC 740, relied on. Statutory Interpretation by Francis Bennion 2nd Edition, Page 617 -referred to. 1.5. Virtual reality is a state where one is made to feel, hear or imagine what does not really exist. Video conferencing has nothing to do with virtual reality. Video conferencing is an advancement in science and technology which permits one to see. hear and talk with someone far away, with the same facility and ease as if he is personally present. In fact he/ she is present on a screen. Except for touching one can see, hear and observe as if the party is in the same room. Thus, so long as the accused and/or his pleader are present when evidence is recorded by video conferencing that evidence is being recorded in the "presence" of the accused and would thus fully meet the requirements of Section 273 Cr.P.C. Recording of such evidence would be as per "procedure established by law". [257-E; 258-A, B, C] 1.6. Recording of evidence by video conferencing also satisfies the object of providing, in Section 273, that evidence be recorded in the presence of the Accused. The Accused and his pleader can see the witness as clearly as if the witness was actually sitting before them. In fact the accused may be able to see the witness better than he may have been able to if he was sitting in the dock in a crowded Court room. They can observe his or her demeanour. In fact the facility to play back would enable better observation of demeanour. They can hear and rehear the deposition of the witness. The accused would be able to instruct his pleader immediately and thus cross-examination of the witness is as effective, if not better. The facility of play back would give an added advantage whilst cross-examining the witness. The witness can be confronted with documents or other material or statement in the same manner as if he/she was in Court. All these objects would be fully met when evidence is recorded by video conferencing. Thus no predspace, of whatsoever nature, is caused to the accused. It is also possible to set up video conferencing equipment in the Court itself. In that case evidence would be recorded by the Magistrate or under his dictation in open Court. [258-D, E, F; 259-A] 1.7. To this method there may arise some difficulties if the witness commits Contempt of Court or perjures himself and it is immediately noticed that he has perjured himself. Therefore, as a matter of prudence evidence by video-conferencing in open Court should be only if the witness is in a country which has an extradition treaty with India and under whose laws Contempt of Court and perjury are also punishable. [259-B] 2.1. In cases where the witness is necessary for the ends of justice and the attendance of such witness cannot be procured without an amount of delay, expense or inconvenience which, under the circumstances of the case would be unreasonable, the Court may dispense with such attendance and issue a commission for examination of the witness. In the instant case, the concerned doctor had refused to come to India to give evidence. His evidence appears to be necessary for the ends of Justice. Courts in India cannot procure his attendance. In such case commission could be issued for recording evidence. Normally a commission would involve recording evidence at the place where the witness is. However, advancement in science and technology has now made it possible to record evidence of witness by way of video conferencing in the town/city where the Court is. Thus in such matters, the Court could consider issuing a commission to record the evidence by way of video-conferencing. However, commission cannot be issued if there is no arrangement between the Government of India and the country where the commission is proposed to be issued because the services of an official of the country (mostly a Judicial Officer) would be required to record such evidence and to ensure attendance. When a witness is willing to give evidence an official of the Court can be deputed to record evidence on commission by way of video-conferencing. The evidence will be recorded in the studio/hall where the video-conferencing takes place. It must be clarified that adopting such a procedure may not be possible if the witness is out of India and not willing to give evidence. [260-D-F; 262-B, C] Ratilal Bhanji Mithani v. State of Maharashtra, [1972] 3 SCC 793, followed. 2.2. Time for recording evidence on commission is always fixed by the officer who has been deputed to so record evidence. The officer would have the discretion to fix up the time in consultation with VSNL, who are experts in the field. Respondent and his counsel will have to make it convenient to attend at the time fixed by the concerned officer. If they do not remain present the Magistrate will take action, as provided in law, to compel attendance. However, the officer deputed would be one who has authority to administer oaths and he will administer the oath. Undoubtedly an officer would have to be deputed, either from India or from the Consulate/Embassy in the country where the evidence is being recorded who would remain present when the evidence is being recorded and who will ensure that there is no other person in the room where the witness is sitting whilst the evidence is being recorded. That officer will ensure that the witness is not coached/tutored/prompted. It would be advisable, though not necessary, that the witness be asked to give evidence in a room in the Consulate/Embassy. As the evidence is being recorded on commission that evidence will subsequently be read into Court. Thus no question arises of the witness insulting the Court. If on reading the evidence the Court finds that the witness has perjured himself, just like in any other evidence on commission, the Court will ignore or disbelieve such evidence. [263-F, G; 264-A-C] 2.3. In the instant case, the concerned officer will ensure that once video conferencing commences, as far as possible, it is proceeded with, without any adjournments. Further it if is found that the doctor in USA is not attending at the time/s fixed, without any sufficient cause, then it would be open for the Magistrate to disallow recording of evidence by video conferencing.

It must be remembered that the first duty of the Court is to do justice. Courts must endeavour to find the truth and that there would be failure of justice not only by an unjust conviction but also by acquittal of the guilty for unjustified failur..

It must be remembered that the first duty of the Court is to do justice. Courts must endeavour to find the truth and that there would be failure of justice not only by an unjust conviction but also by acquittal of the guilty for unjustified failure to produce available evidence. Of course the rights of the accused have to be kept in mind and safeguarded, but they should not be over emphasized to the extent of forgetting that the victims also have rights. [255-A, B] Sri Krishna Gobe v. Stale of Maharashtra, [1973] 4 SCC 23, relied on. 1.4. It must also be remembered that the Criminal Procedure Code is an ongoing statute. The principles of interpreting an ongoing statute have been very succinctly set out by the jurists and referred by Courts in number of cases. The apex Court has approved the principle of updating construction as enunciated by Francis Bennion, in a number of decisions. However, it is well settled law that the doctrine "Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimm" has no application when interpreting a provision of an ongoing statute. [255-C; 256-E; 257-D] National Textile Workers' Union v. P.R. Ramakrishnan, [1983] 1 SCC 228; Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v. M/s. Podar Cement Pvt. Ltd., [1997] 5 SCC 482; State v. S.J. Chowdhury, [1996] 2 SCC 428; SIL Import USA v. Exim Aides Silk Exporters, [1999] 4 SCC 567 and Basavaraj R. Patil v. State of Karnataka, [2000] 8 SCC 740, relied on. Statutory Interpretation by Francis Bennion 2nd Edition, Page 617 -referred to. 1.5. Virtual reality is a state where one is made to feel, hear or imagine what does not really exist. Video conferencing has nothing to do with virtual reality. Video conferencing is an advancement in science and technology which permits one to see. hear and talk with someone far away, with the same facility and ease as if he is personally present. In fact he/ she is present on a screen. Except for touching one can see, hear and observe as if the party is in the same room. Thus, so long as the accused and/or his pleader are present when evidence is recorded by video conferencing that evidence is being recorded in the "presence" of the accused and would thus fully meet the requirements of Section 273 Cr.P.C. Recording of such evidence would be as per "procedure established by law". [257-E; 258-A, B, C] 1.6. Recording of evidence by video conferencing also satisfies the object of providing, in Section 273, that evidence be recorded in the presence of the Accused. The Accused and his pleader can see the witness as clearly as if the witness was actually sitting before them. In fact the accused may be able to see the witness better than he may have been able to if he was sitting in the dock in a crowded Court room. They can observe his or her demeanour. In fact the facility to play back would enable better observation of demeanour. They can hear and rehear the deposition of the witness. The accused would be able to instruct his pleader immediately and thus cross-examination of the witness is as effective, if not better. The facility of play back would give an added advantage whilst cross-examining the witness. The witness can be confronted with documents or other material or statement in the same manner as if he/she was in Court. All these objects would be fully met when evidence is recorded by video conferencing. Thus no predspace, of whatsoever nature, is caused to the accused. It is also possible to set up video conferencing equipment in the Court itself. In that case evidence would be recorded by the Magistrate or under his dictation in open Court. [258-D, E, F; 259-A] 1.7. To this method there may arise some difficulties if the witness commits Contempt of Court or perjures himself and it is immediately noticed that he has perjured himself. Therefore, as a matter of prudence evidence by video-conferencing in open Court should be only if the witness is in a country which has an extradition treaty with India and under whose laws Contempt of Court and perjury are also punishable. [259-B] 2.1. In cases where the witness is necessary for the ends of justice and the attendance of such witness cannot be procured without an amount of delay, expense or inconvenience which, under the circumstances of the case would be unreasonable, the Court may dispense with such attendance and issue a commission for examination of the witness. In the instant case, the concerned doctor had refused to come to India to give evidence. His evidence appears to be necessary for the ends of Justice. Courts in India cannot procure his attendance. In such case commission could be issued for recording evidence. Normally a commission would involve recording evidence at the place where the witness is. However, advancement in science and technology has now made it possible to record evidence of witness by way of video conferencing in the town/city where the Court is. Thus in such matters, the Court could consider issuing a commission to record the evidence by way of video-conferencing. However, commission cannot be issued if there is no arrangement between the Government of India and the country where the commission is proposed to be issued because the services of an official of the country (mostly a Judicial Officer) would be required to record such evidence and to ensure attendance. When a witness is willing to give evidence an official of the Court can be deputed to record evidence on commission by way of video-conferencing. The evidence will be recorded in the studio/hall where the video-conferencing takes place. It must be clarified that adopting such a procedure may not be possible if the witness is out of India and not willing to give evidence. [260-D-F; 262-B, C] Ratilal Bhanji Mithani v. State of Maharashtra, [1972] 3 SCC 793, followed. 2.2. Time for recording evidence on commission is always fixed by the officer who has been deputed to so record evidence. The officer would have the discretion to fix up the time in consultation with VSNL, who are experts in the field. Respondent and his counsel will have to make it convenient to attend at the time fixed by the concerned officer. If they do not remain present the Magistrate will take action, as provided in law, to compel attendance. However, the officer deputed would be one who has authority to administer oaths and he will administer the oath. Undoubtedly an officer would have to be deputed, either from India or from the Consulate/Embassy in the country where the evidence is being recorded who would remain present when the evidence is being recorded and who will ensure that there is no other person in the room where the witness is sitting whilst the evidence is being recorded. That officer will ensure that the witness is not coached/tutored/prompted. It would be advisable, though not necessary, that the witness be asked to give evidence in a room in the Consulate/Embassy. As the evidence is being recorded on commission that evidence will subsequently be read into Court. Thus no question arises of the witness insulting the Court. If on reading the evidence the Court finds that the witness has perjured himself, just like in any other evidence on commission, the Court will ignore or disbelieve such evidence. [263-F, G; 264-A-C] 2.3. In the instant case, the concerned officer will ensure that once video conferencing commences, as far as possible, it is proceeded with, without any adjournments. Further it if is found that the doctor in USA is not attending at the time/s fixed, without any sufficient cause, then it would be open for the Magistrate to disallow recording of evidence by video conferencing.

Constitution - Sections 6, 16 and 34B of Show

Constitution - Sections 6, 16 and 34B of Extradition Act, 1962 - Appellant challenged the validity of warrant .Appellant must be held to be in lawful custody of his daughter unless any other or further order is passed by a court of competent jurisdiction.  Lastly, it is imperative to note that the State does not seek for enforcement of the custody and/ or restrain order passed by the Probate and Family Court, Massachusetts in view of the rigours contained in Sections 13 and 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure. Even the Family Court does not appear to have dealt with this aspect of the matter. In any event, as the matter is pending before the High Court, it alone will have a final say therein. For the aforementioned reasons, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

Charges framed against the Appellant not only for the offences for which the Appellant has been extradited but also for some additional offences - Challenge against thereto - Whether the criminal courts in the country have no jurisdiction to try i..

Charges framed against the Appellant not only for the offences for which the Appellant has been extradited but also for some additional offences - Challenge against thereto - Whether the criminal courts in the country have no jurisdiction to try in respect of offences which do not form part of the extradition judgment, and the Appellant/accused can be tried only for the offences mentioned in the extradition decree - Held, when a person is extradited for a particular crime, he can be tried for only that crime - Section 21 of the Act, 1962 makes a specific provision to that effect - As per 1993 amendment, a fugitive could be tried for a lesser offence, without restoring him to the State from which he was extradited or for any other offence, if the State concerned gives its consent - Contention that Appellant had been extradited under International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (the Convention) and therefore, he can be tried only for the offences which are related to the said Convention cannot be sustained - Court at Portugal has not granted extradition merely on the basis of Extradition Treaty but also on the basis of reciprocity - Extradition request was made to the Government of Portugal by the Government of India under the provisions of the Extradition Act applicable to Non Treaty States i.e. Section 19 of the Act, 1962 - Appellant can also be tried for lesser offence/offences in view of Section 21 of the Act as disclosed by the facts - Designated Judge has correctly concluded that the Appellant can be tried for lesser offences, even if, the same are not covered by the Extradition Decree since the same is permitted under Section 21(b) of the Act, 1962 - Appeal dismissedCriminal - Extradition of Fugitive - Extradition ensures a mode of formal surrender of an accused by the one country to another based on Reciprocal arrangements - Held, Fair balance needs to be struck between Human Rights norms and the need to tackle Transnational crime - Extradition allowed on the specific undertaking of the Government of India that the extradited criminal will not be subjected to death penalty or imprisonment beyond 25 years - Amendment to the Extradition Act, enables the requesting State to try the fugitive for a lesser offence without restoring him to the requested State - Doctrine of double criminality and Specialty are both safeguards of the individual rights of the extradited accused who should not be tried on unexpected counts, as well as the rights of the requested State to have its laws and processes given adequate deference by the requesting State - Appeal Dismissed

Respondent accused was sentenced for the offence of Rape with the victim known to him by the Trial court - on appeal High court reduced the sentence to the period undergone taking the accused age into consideration - Hence the appeal - Held, '..

Respondent accused was sentenced for the offence of Rape with the victim known to him by the Trial court - on appeal High court reduced the sentence to the period undergone taking the accused age into consideration - Hence the appeal - Held, ' rape is the carnal knowledge of any woman, above the age of particular years, against her will; or of a woman child, under that age, with or against her will' - Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 376 minimum sentences are prescribed - Both in cases of Sub-sections (1) and (2) the Court has the discretion to impose a sentence of imprisonment less than the prescribed minimum for `adequate and special reasons'. 18. In order to exercise the discretion of reducing the sentence the statutory requirement is that the Court has to record "adequate and special reasons" in the judgment and not fanciful reasons which would permit the Court to impose a sentence less than the prescribed minimum. The reason has not only to be adequate but also special. What is adequate and special would depend upon several factors and no strait- jacket formula can be indicated. What is applicable to trial Courts regarding recording reasons for a departure from minimum sentence is equally applicable to the High Court. The only reason indicated by the High Court is that the accused belonged to rural areas. The same can by no stretch of imagination be considered either adequate or special. The requirement in law is cumulative - undisputedly, the victim was less than 16 years of age at the time of occurrence. Evidence also shows that the victim and accused were in love and the victim admitted that she had sexual intercourse with the accused. That of course has no relevance because of her age being less than sixteen years - appeal allowed

Case Note: Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 364A, 325, 323, 384, 342 and 506Show

Case Note: Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 364A, 325, 323, 384, 342 and 506http://olisindia.in/files/cases/IPC.pdf all r/w Section 120B--Abduction for ransom, etc.--Conviction and sentence--Whether justified? -- Held, yes--Accused persons in daring day light bid kidnapped child right in presence of his mother--And caused grievous hurt to her--Demanded ransom of Rs. 5 lakhs in writing for life of child--Demand note clearly brings out threat to life of child if ransom not paid--Offence under Section 364A clearly made out--No merit in appeal.

Noise of victim was heard by witnesses--Presence of witnesses was natural--Witness are reliable and corroborative--Involvement of accused in the incident proved--Voice as recorded matched with original voice of victim--Finger prints on recovered c..

Noise of victim was heard by witnesses--Presence of witnesses was natural--Witness are reliable and corroborative--Involvement of accused in the incident proved--Voice as recorded matched with original voice of victim--Finger prints on recovered car matched--Plea of alibi not proved--Circumstantial evidence inspire confidence--Consideration of--Held--conviction entirely based on proper appreciation of evidence on record--No need for any interference--Appeal dismissed. [Para--7] Criminal Law--Kidnapping-Status of witness--Held--Where presence of witness is natural then it can not be dubbed as chance witness. [Para--7]

While acquitting all the accused persons from the charge of offence under Section Show

While acquitting all the accused persons from the charge of offence under Section 366A and 372 read with Section 511 IPC, we acquit the appellant Nos. 1 and 2 from all charges. Whereas, we hold that the appellant No. 3 is guilty of the offence under Section 363 IPC and accordingly we proceed to convict him accordingly. 59. Having held thus, we have to pass an order of sentence against the said accused-appellant No. 3. The incident is that of the year 1992 and 15 years have gone by, therefore, interest of justice would be sub-served if appellant No. 3 is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years. 60.Bail bond submitted by Appellant Nos. 1 and 2 stand discharged whereas the bail bond of accused No. 3 stands cancelled and he shall immediately surrender so as to undergo the remaining punishment.  

The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public abhorrence and it sho..

The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public abhorrence and it should "respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminal". [Para 25] [414-D] 2.1 Section 304-A IPC applies to cases where there is no intention to cause death and no knowledge that the act done in all probability will cause death. The provision is directed at offences outside the range of Sections 299 and 300 IPC. The provision applies only to such acts which are rash and negligent and are directly cause of death of another person. Negligence and rashness are essential elements u/s. 304-A. Culpable negligence lies in the failure to exercise reasonable and proper care and the extent of its reasonableness will always depend upon the circumstances of each case. Rashness means doing an act with the consciousness of a risk that evil consequences will follow but with the hope that it will not. [Para 7] [406- F-H] 2.2 A negligent act is an act done without doing something which a reasonable man guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs would do or act which a prudent or reasonable man would not do in the circumstances attending it. A rash act is a negligent act done precipitately. Negligence is the genus, of which rashness is the species. [Para 6] [405-G-H; 406-A-B] Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1937) AC 576 - referred to. 2.3 Negligence is a breach of duty imposed by law. In criminal cases, the amount and degree of negligence are determining factOTHERS A question whether the accused's conduct amounted to culpable rashness or negligence depends directly on the question as to what is the amount of care and circumspection which a prudent and reasonable man would consider to be sufficient consi-dering all the circumstances of the case.

The social impact of the crime, e.g. where it relates to offences against women, and offences of dacoity, kidnapping,misappropriation of public money, treason and other offences involving moral turpitude or moral delinquency ..

The social impact of the crime, e.g. where it relates to offences against women, and offences of dacoity, kidnapping,misappropriation of public money, treason and other offences involving moral turpitude or moral delinquency which have great impact on social order, and public interest, cannot be lost sight of and per se require exemplary treatment. Any liberal attitude by imposing meager sentences or taking too sympathetic a view merely on account of lapse of time in respect of such offences will be result-wise counter productive in the long run and against societal interest which needs to be cared for and strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system. [Para 14] [1046-G-H; 1047-A-B] Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B. 1994 (2) SCC 220; Ravji v. State of Rajasthan 1996 (2) SCC 175 and State of M.P. v. Ghanshyam Singh 2003 (8) SCC 13, referred to. 2. In both sub-sections (1) and (2) of s.376 IPC, minimum sentences are prescribed. Both in cases of sub-sections (1) and (2) the court has the discretion to impose a sentence of imprisonment less than the prescribed minimum for `adequate and special reasons. In order to exercise the discretion of reducing the sentence the statutory requirement is that the court has to record "adequate and special reasons" in the judgment and not fanciful reasons which would permit the court to impose a sentence less than the prescribed minimum. The reason has not only to be adequate but also special. If the court does not mention such reasons in the judgment there is no scope for awarding a sentence lesser than the prescribed minimum. In the instant case, the only reason indicated by the High Court is that the accused belonged to rural areas. The same can by no stretch of imagination be considered either adequate or special. The requirement in law is cumulative. Considering the legal position, the High Court's order is clearly unsustainable and is accordingly set aside. 

Indian Penal Code, 1860

After giving due consideration to the facts and circumstances of each case, for deciding just and appropriate sentence to be awarded for an offence, the aggravating and mitigating factOTHERS and circumstances in which a crime has been committed ar..

After giving due consideration to the facts and circumstances of each case, for deciding just and appropriate sentence to be awarded for an offence, the aggravating and mitigating factOTHERS and circumstances in which a crime has been committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis of really relevant circumstances in a dispassionate manner by the Court. [Para 8] [888-F-G] 2.3. In the absence of any foolproof formula which may provide any basis for reasonable criteria to correctly assess various circumstances germane to the consideration of gravity of crime, the discretionary judgment in the facts of each case, is the only way in which such judgment may be equitably distinguished. [Para 8] [888-H; 889-A-B] 2.4. The object should be to protect the society and to deter the criminal in achieving the avowed object of law by imposing appropriate sentence. It is expected that the Courts would operate the sentencing system so as to impose such sentence which reflects the conscience of the society and the sentencing process has to be stern where it should be. [Para 9] [889-C] 2.5. Imposition of sentence without considering its effect on the social order in many cases may be in reality a futile exercise. The social impact of the crime, e.g. where it relates to offences against women, dacoity, kidnapping, misappropriation of public money, treason and other offences involving moral turpitude or moral delinquency which have great impact on social order, and public interest, cannot be lost sight of and per se require exemplary treatment. Any liberal attitude by imposing meager sentences or taking too sympathetic view merely on account of lapse of time in respect of such offences will be result-wise counter productive in the long run and against societal interest which needs to be cared for and strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system. [Para 10] [889-D-F] 2.6. Court will be failing in its duty if appropriate punishment is not awarded for a crime which has been committed not only against the individual victim but also against the society to which the criminal and victim belong. The punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated, the enormity of the crime warranting public abhorrence and it should "respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminal.

Indian Penal Code, 1860

 Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law and society could not long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every..

 Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law and society could not long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed etc. [Para 8] [1173-G-H; 1174-A] 2.3. The criminal law adheres in general to the principle of proportionality in prescribing liability according to the culpability of each kind of criminal conduct. It ordinarily allows some significant discretion to the Judge in arriving at a sentence in each case, presumably to permit sentences that reflect more subtle considerations of culpability that are raised by the special facts of each case. Judges in essence affirm that punishment, ought always to fit the crime; yet in practice sentences are determined largely by other considerations. Sometimes it is the correctional needs of the perpetrator that are offered to justify a sentence. Sometimes the desirability of keeping him out of circulation, and sometimes even the tragic results of his crime. Inevitably these considerations cause a departure from just desert as the basis of punishment and create cases of apparent injustice that are serious and widespread. [Para 9] [1174-B-E] 2.4. After giving due consideration to the facts and circumstances of each case, for deciding just and appropriate sentence to be awarded for an offence, the aggravating and mitigating factOTHERS and circumstances in which a crime has been committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis of really relevant circumstances in a dispassionate manner by the Court. [Para 11] [1174-H; 1175-A-B] 2.5. No formula of a foolproof nature is possible that would provide a reasonable criterion in determining a just and appropriate punishment in the infinite variety of circumstances that may affect the gravity of the crime. In the absence of any foolproof formula which may provide any basis for reasonable crieteria to correctly assess various circumstances germane to the consideration of gravity of crime, the discretionary judgment in the facts of each case, is the only way in which such judgment may be equitably distinguished. [Para 11] [1175-C-D] 2.6. Imposition of sentence without considering its effect on the social order in many cases may be in reality a futile exercise. The social impact of the crime, e.g. where it relates to offences against women, dacoity, kidnapping, misappropriation of public money, treason and other offences involving moral turpitude or moral delinquency which have great impact on social order, and public interest, cannot be lost sight of and per se require exemplary treatment. Any liberal attitude by imposing meager sentences or taking too sympathetic view merely on account of lapse of time in respect of such offences will be result-wise counter productive in the long run and against societal interest which needs to be cared for and strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system. [Para 13] [1175-G-H; 1176-A-B] 2.7. Justice demands that Courts should impose punishment befitting the crime so that the Courts reflect public abhorrence of the crime. The Court must not only keep in view the rights of the criminal but also the rights of the victim of the crime and the society at large while considering the imposition of appropriate punishment. 

Indian Penal Code, 1860

The object of examination under this Section is to give the accused an opportunity to explain the case made against him. This statement can be taken into consideration in judging his innocence or guilt. Where there is an onus on the accused to dis..

The object of examination under this Section is to give the accused an opportunity to explain the case made against him. This statement can be taken into consideration in judging his innocence or guilt. Where there is an onus on the accused to discharge, it depends on the facts and circumstances of the case if such statement discharges the onus. The word `generally' in sub-section (1) (b) does not limit the nature of the questioning to one or more questions of a general nature relating to the case, but it means that the question should relate to the whole case generally and should also be limited to any particular part or parts of it. The question must be framed in such a way as to enable the accused to know what he is to explain, what are the circumstances which are against him and for which an explanation is needed. The whole object of the section is to afford the accused a fair and proper opportunity of explaining circumstances which appear against him and that the questions must be fair and must be couched in a form which an ignorant or illiterate person will be able to appreciate and understand. A conviction based on the accused's failure to explain what he was never asked to explain is bad in law. The whole object of enacting Section 313 Cr. P.C. was that the attention of the accused should be drawn to the specific points in the charge and in the evidence on which the prosecution claims that the case is made out against the accused so that he may be able to give such explanation as he desires to give. It is not sufficient compliance to string together a long series of facts and ask the accused what he has to say about them. He must be questioned separately about each material substance which is intended to be used against him. The questionings must be fair and couched in a form which an ignorant or illiterate person will be able to appreciate and understand. Even when an accused is not illiterate, his mind is apt to be perturbed when he is facing a serious charge. Fairness, therefore, requires that each material circumstance should be put simply and separately in a way that an illiterate mind, or one which is perturbed or confused, can readily appreciate and understand. [Paras 5-7] [658-F-H; 659-A-F] 2. It is true as contented for the appellant that no incriminating materials were put to the accused under Section 313 Cr. P.C. There is no accusation specifically put in question during examination. It only refers to kidnapping.

In a matter of rape, though statement of prosecutrix must be given primary consideration, but at the same time the broad principle that the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt applies equally to a case of rape and there can b..

In a matter of rape, though statement of prosecutrix must be given primary consideration, but at the same time the broad principle that the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt applies equally to a case of rape and there can be no presumption that a prosecutrix would always tell the entire story truthfully - Prosecutrix in her earlier statement has not attributed the offences of rape and kidnapping to one of the appellants - Therefore, in the light of contradictions, some doubt is created with regard to his involvement - He is accordingly acquitted - As regards the other appellant, statements of the prosecutrix and other witnesses are categoric - Prosecutrix clearly stated that she had been kidnapped and raped by this accused and the absconding accused - His appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

Indian Penal Code, 1860

This was clearly conveyed to the victim PW-2. He was even conveyed the amount to be paid. There is no infirmity in the judgment of the courts below to warrant any interference. [447-D; 448-A] 2.1.

The factum of kidnapping of the deceased by the accused-appellant, therefore, stands duly established. [Para 24] 1.2. Having proved the factum of kidnapping, the inference of the consequential murder of the kidnapped person, is liable to be presum..

The factum of kidnapping of the deceased by the accused-appellant, therefore, stands duly established. [Para 24] 1.2. Having proved the factum of kidnapping, the inference of the consequential murder of the kidnapped person, is liable to be presumed. Once the person concerned has been shown as having been kidnapped, the onus would shift on the kidnapper to establish how and when the kidnapped individual came to be released from his custody. In the absence of any such proof produced by the kidnapper, it would be natural to infer/presume, that the kidnapped person continued in the kidnapper's custody, till he was eliminated. The instant conclusion would also emerge from Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872. [Para 26] 1.3. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, there is sufficient evidence on the record on the basis whereof even the factum of murder of the deceased at the hands of the accused-appellant stands established. In the facts and circumstances of this case, it has been duly established, that the deceased was kidnapped by the accused- appellant
the accused-appellant was not able to produce any material on the record to show the release of the deceased from his custody. Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 places the onus on him. In the absence of any such material produced by the accused-appellant, it has to be accepted, that the custody of the deceased had remained with the accused-appellant, till he was murdered. The motive/reason for the accused-appellant, for taking the extreme step was, that ransom as demanded by him, had not been paid. [Para 27] 1.4. The accused-appellant had made a confessional statement in the presence of PW13 stating that he had strangulated the deceased to death, whereupon his body was put into a gunny bag and thrown into a particular tank. It was thereafter, on the pointing out of the accused-appellant, that the body of the deceased was recovered from that tank. It was found in a gunny bag, as stated by the accused-appellant. PW12, the doctor concluded after holding the post-mortem examination of the dead body of the deceased, that he had died on account of suffocation, prior to his having been drowned.

Indian Penal Code, 1860

Indian Evidence Act, 1872

The University has to live the role of Loco Parentis and show its concern to redress the grievances in proper perspective. Not for nothing Ralph Waldo Emerson had said “the secret of education is respecting pupil”. Thus, the necessity ..

The University has to live the role of Loco Parentis and show its concern to redress the grievances in proper perspective. Not for nothing Ralph Waldo Emerson had said “the secret of education is respecting pupil”. Thus, the necessity of the visually impaired students 1Page 15 should have primacy in the mind of the Empowered Committee of the University. Education for visually impaired students is a great hope for them and such a hope is the brightest bliss in their lives. History has recorded with pride that some men with visual impairment have shown high intellectual prowess. The anguish and despondency in the life of Milton, the famous English poet, did not deter him to carry out the mission of his life. Lack of vision could not destroy his Will power. Needless to say that he had the support of the society. The ancient sage “Ashtavakra” while laying down the traffic rules had categorically stated that the blind man has the first right on the road. Thus, emphasis has always been laid on the visually impaired persons for many a reason. When we say so, we may not be understood to have said that otherwise impaired or disabled people are to be treated differently in the constitutional and statutory scheme. We have only laid emphasis on the visually impaired students for the purpose of present case. It is the need of the present time that the University shall look into the matter and mitigate the grievances of the visually impaired students as far as possible. We have already indicated that we are not experts. But we are disposed to think that the problem has remained unsolved. The same is required to be addressed to in an apposite manner. We do not intend to say that it has not at all been addressed but there has to be more focus, more empathy and more sensitivity. Therefore, we permit the appellant-organisation to submit a representation indicating its grievances and the views to the said Committee within three days which shall be dealt with by the Committee within a week hence.

Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights
and Full Participation) Act, 1995

Constitution of India

Court have been informed that the appellant is a senior citizen. He is suffering from ‘Endstage Renal Disease’. It appears that he is required to undergo dialysis twice a week. This information is supplied to this Court by D.I.G., Alla..

Court have been informed that the appellant is a senior citizen. He is suffering from ‘Endstage Renal Disease’. It appears that he is required to undergo dialysis twice a week. This information is supplied to this Court by D.I.G., Allahabad range. The appellant’s health condition is, therefore, precarious. While we sympathise with the appellant on this aspect, law must be allowed to take its own course. The appellant, however, will be at liberty to approach the State Government for commutation of his sentence or the Jail Superintendent for premature release under the provisions of the U.P. Jail Manual, a deemed appropriate. 

Indian Penal Code, 1860

The extra-judicial confession was made by accused to the prosecution witness in a different background inasmuch as the accused suspected that he had been identified by the witness and he returned to warn her not to divulge any information to anyon..

The extra-judicial confession was made by accused to the prosecution witness in a different background inasmuch as the accused suspected that he had been identified by the witness and he returned to warn her not to divulge any information to anyone - Statement of the prosecution witness recorded u/s. 164 Cr.P.C is almost in identical terms - The very proximity of the murder and the extra- judicial confession made to the prosecution witness shows that the confession is reliable - Also, the alleged murderweapon, had been recovered at the instance of the accused - Though, independent witnesses of the recovery did not support the prosecution, but no reason to doubt the evidence of the Investigating Officer - Thus, prosecution case proved beyond reasonable doubt - Evidence - Extra-judicial confession. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 131 of 2006. From the JudgmentAND Order dated 24.8.2001 of the High Court of Gauhati at Gauhati in Criminal Appeal No. 170 of 2000. Praneet Ranjan (A.C.) Rranay Ranjan, Hemant Kr. Yadav, Rajesh Mishra for the Appellant. Avijit Roy Corporate Law Group for the Respondent.

It is true, as contended, that the relations between the two parties were extremely strained on account of the murder of Prem. While this fact could, undoubtedly, be a reason for false implication of the accused, but on the contrary, it could also..

It is true, as contended, that the relations between the two parties were extremely strained on account of the murder of Prem. While this fact could, undoubtedly, be a reason for false implication of the accused, but on the contrary, it could also be a motive for the commission of 6Crl. Appeal No.115 of 2007 the crime. However, in the light of the fact that the FIR had been recorded within a reasonable time of the incident and the medical evidence fully supports the ocular version, and additionally, the trial court has given the benefit of doubt to some of the accused, as they had no active role to play, the possibility of false implication has also been examined and dealt with. The courts below have, in our opinion, rightly assessed the evidence and being cognizant of the strained relations between the parties and the possibility of false implication, have accordingly given the benefit of doubt to two of the accused. No interference is thus called for by us in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.

Indian Penal Code, 1860

Court revealed that  no hesitation in holding that disparaging remarks, as recorded by the learned single Judge, are not necessary for arriving at the decision which he has rendered, the same being not an integral part and further that could ..

Court revealed that  no hesitation in holding that disparaging remarks, as recorded by the learned single Judge, are not necessary for arriving at the decision which he has rendered, the same being not an integral part and further that could not have been done when the appellant was not a party before the court and also he was never afforded an opportunity to explain his conduct, and the affirmation of the same by the Division Bench on the foundation that it has not caused any prejudice and he can fully defend himself when a subsequent litigation is instituted, are legally unacceptable. Accordingly, we expunge the extracted remarks hereinbefore and also any remarks which have 24 (2007) 3 SCC 587 Page 22 22 been made that are likely to affect the reputation of the appellant. Since, the appeal is confined only to expunging of adverse remarks, the same is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

Constitution of India, 1952

The three-Judge Bench in Shatrughan Chauhan (supra) held that insanity/mental illness/schizophrenia is also one of the supervening circumstances for commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment. By applying the principle enunciated in Shatru..

The three-Judge Bench in Shatrughan Chauhan (supra) held that insanity/mental illness/schizophrenia is also one of the supervening circumstances for commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment. By applying the principle enunciated in Shatrughan Chauhan (supra), the accused cannot be executed with the said health condition. In the light of the above discussion and also in view of the ratio laid down in Shatrughan Chauhan (supra), we deem it fit to commute the death sentence imposed on Devender Pal Singh Bhullar into life imprisonment both on the ground of unexplained/inordinate delay of 8 years in disposal of mercy petition and on the ground of insanity. To this extent, the Curative Petition stands allowed.

The documents produced by Shri K.T.S. Tulsi do give an indication that on account of prolonged detention in jail after his conviction and sentence to death, the petitioner has suffered physically and mentally, the same cannot be relied upon for re..

The documents produced by Shri K.T.S. Tulsi do give an indication that on account of prolonged detention in jail after his conviction and sentence to death, the petitioner has suffered physically and mentally, the same cannot be relied upon for recording a finding that the petitioner’s mental health has deteriorated to such an extent that the sentence awarded to him cannot be executed. Before parting with the judgment, we consider it necessary to take cognizance of a rather disturbing phenomena. The statistics produced by the learned Additional Solicitor General show that between 1950 and 2009, over 300 mercy petitions were filed of which 214 were accepted by the President and the sentence of death was commuted into life imprisonment. 69 petitions were rejected by the President. The result of one petition is obscure. However, about 18 petitions filed between 1999 and 2011 remained pending for a period ranging from 1 year to 13 years. A chart showing the details of such petitions is annexed with the Judgment as Schedule ‘A’. The particulars 6Page 68 contained in Schedule ‘A’ give an impression that the Government and the President’s Secretariat have not dealt with these petitions with requisite seriousness. We hope and trust that in future such petitions will be disposed of without unreasonable delay. For the reasons stated above, we hold that the petitioners have failed to make out a case for invalidation of the exercise of power by the President under Article 72 of the Constitution not to accept the prayer for commutation of the sentence of death into life imprisonment. The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed.

Murder of six members of a family including helpless women and children having been committed in a brutal, diabolic and bristly manner and the crime being one which is enormous in proportion which shocks the conscious of law, the death sentence as..

Murder of six members of a family including helpless women and children having been committed in a brutal, diabolic and bristly manner and the crime being one which is enormous in proportion which shocks the conscious of law, the death sentence as awarded in respect of accused Sattan and Guddu was the appropriate sentence and the High Court ought not to have altered it. So far as the acquittal of the Hari Pal son of Kiran Singh and Hari Pal son of Ram Charan are concerned, the High Court has noted that the evidence so far as their involvement is concerned was not totally free from doubt. The High Court have analysed the factual scenario in detail to direct the acquittal. We find no reason to differ from the conclusions of the High Court. The acquittal as directed stands affirmed. So far as other four respondents i.e. appellants in Criminal Appeal No.2237 of 1999 is concerned they were charged under Section 120 B. It has been recorded by the High Court that except the suspicion which the informantwas having in her mind about the involvement of these four accused persons there was neither any direct or circumstantial evidence to fasten the charge of criminal conspiracy. That being so the High Court was justified in 28directing their acquittal. Criminal Appeal No. 314 is allowed. The State’s appeal so far as Sattan and Upendra are concerned is allowed to the extent that the death sentence as was awarded by the trial court is restored so far as they are concerned. The appeal fails so far as respondents Hari Pal son of Kiran Singh and Hari Pal son of Ram Charan are concerned

An overall global view of all the circumstances in the light of the aforesaid propositions and taking into account the answers to the questions posed by way of the test for the rarest of rare cases, the circumstances 38of the case are such that de..

An overall global view of all the circumstances in the light of the aforesaid propositions and taking into account the answers to the questions posed by way of the test for the rarest of rare cases, the circumstances 38of the case are such that death sentence is warranted, the court would proceed to do so. What is culled out from the decisions noted above is that while deciding the question as to whether the extreme penalty of death sentence is to be awarded, a balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to be drawn up.  This position is highlighted in Union of India & Ors. v. Devendra Nath Rai [ 2006 (2) SCC 243].  The case at hand falls in the rarest of rare category. The past instances highlighted above, the depraved acts of the accused call for only one sentence that is death sentence. Looked at from any angle the judgment of the High Court, confirming the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court, do not warrant any interference. 

It is worth mentioning that in the present case the High Court had aquitted both Accused 5, M Zuber Kasam Shaikh and Accused 6, Fazal Mohd Shaikh. It is from that acquittal that appeals for their conviction and sentencing come before us. While imp..

It is worth mentioning that in the present case the High Court had aquitted both Accused 5, M Zuber Kasam Shaikh and Accused 6, Fazal Mohd Shaikh. It is from that acquittal that appeals for their conviction and sentencing come before us. While imposing the sentence of life on the accussed the Court must have the judgment of acquittal of the High Court in the back of its mind. In our considered opinion if at least one of the courts below had acquitted the accused person in respect of the crimes for which they are to be sentenced, the burden on the prosecution would be even more heavier, which the State in our opinion has not been able to discharge.  If a person is sentenced to imprisonment, even if it be for life, and subsequently it is found that he was innocent and was wrongly convicted, he can be set free. Of course, the imprisonment that he has suffered till then cannot be undone and the time he has spent in the prison cannot be given back. Such a reversal is not possible where a person has been wrongly convicted and sentenced to death. The execution of the sentence of death in such cases makes miscarriage of justice irrevocable. It is a finality which cannot be corrected. And once Accused 5, M Zuber Kasam Shaikh and Accused 6 Fazal Mohd Shaikh have been sentenced to life there remains no question of awarding a death sentence to Accused 7,Azzizuddin Zahiruddin Shaikh who had played no greater a role in the said incident as Accused 5, M Zuber Kasam Shaikh and Accused 6 Fazal Mohd Shaikh. All the three accused stand on an equal footing and therefore the sentences to be imposed upon them must not differ. It is for the aforementioned reasons that the appeals filed by the State as regard the imposition of a death Sentence deserves to be dismissed.

The evidence of PW-2 was in line with F.I.R. and his statement given to the police. Apart from minor discrepancies which are bound to appear in a natural course of conduct of a normal human being, there were no serious material discrepancies in th..

The evidence of PW-2 was in line with F.I.R. and his statement given to the police. Apart from minor discrepancies which are bound to appear in a natural course of conduct of a normal human being, there were no serious material discrepancies in the evidence in order to completely discard their evidence. There is no reason to doubt the credibility of all these witnesses. There is no reason why they would falsely try to implicate the appellant. Nothing was shown on record that these witnesses were having strained relations with the appellant. On the other hand, it was clearly made out from the evidence that they were having cordial relations and were visiting each other quite often. [Paras 27 and 29] [1094-B-E] 2. It is manifest from the evidence that the appellant had got himself admitted in Civil Hospital on 4.3.2005 and was under treatment. According to the doctor PW-10, the appellant was admitted on 4.2.2005 at about 6.30 a.m. and was discharged on 7.3.2005. The doctor was not able to conclusively say that any Sulphas tablet was taken by the appellant or not. He deposed that after taking tablets, it is difficult to survive for a long period. Appellant did not offer any explanation as to where was he before his admission in the hospital on the fateful day. Plea of alibi taken by him was not found to be truthful as the same stood falsified from the evidence of PW-4 who had sIndian Penal Code, 1860een him coming out of his own house at 5.00 a.m. This was only indicative of the fact that after commission of the alleged crime, he got himself admitted in the Civil Hospital. It is certain that he had committed the crime sometime in night and then got himself admitted in the hospital at 6.30 a.m. Looking to the totality of the facts and features of the case and keeping in view the evidence available on record, there is no doubt that the offence was committed by the appellant only. 

Indian Penal Code, 1860

Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, we make it clear that in the event of State invoking its powers under Show

Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, we make it clear that in the event of State invoking its powers under Section 432 or 433 of Cr.PC, the sentence under Section 376 of IPC shall not be remitted or commuted before seven years of imprisonment. In other words, in that eventuality, it shall be ensured that the respondent will first serve the term of life imprisonment under Section 302 of IPC. In case there is any remission after fourteen years, then imprisonment for a minimum period of seven years under Section 376 of IPC shall follow and thereafter three years of rigorous imprisonment under Section 201 of IPC. The sentence on fine and default as awarded by the Sessions Court are maintained as such. 

Balancing the two sets of circumstances i.e. one favouring commutation and the other favouring upholding the death penalty, we are of the view that in the present case the option of life sentence is not “unquestionably foreclosed”. The..

Balancing the two sets of circumstances i.e. one favouring commutation and the other favouring upholding the death penalty, we are of the view that in the present case the option of life sentence is not “unquestionably foreclosed”. Therefore, the sentence of death awarded to the accused should be commuted to life imprisonment.

                                       Arms Act, 1959    Code of criminal Procedure, 1973

Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with appeals, particularly, against the order of acquittal: (i) There is no limitation on the part of the Appellate Co..

Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with appeals, particularly, against the order of acquittal: (i) There is no limitation on the part of the Appellate Court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is found. (ii) The Appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal can review the entire evidence and come to its own conclusions. (iii) The Appellate Court can also review the Trial Court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. (iv) While dealing with the appeal preferred by the State, it is the duty of the Appellate Court to marshal the entire evidence on record and by giving cogent and adequate reasons set aside the judgment of acquittal. (v) An order of acquittal is to be interfered only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons" for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. (vi) While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the Appellate Court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether finding of the Trial Court are palpably wrong, manifestly, erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the Appellate Court answers the above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the Appellate Court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities, it can reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusion. (vii) When the Trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of Ballistic Experts etc., the Appellate Court is competent to reverse the decision of the Trial Court depending on the materials placed.

Arms Act, 1959                 &             Indian Penal Code, 1860

The specific case of the appellant before this Court is that the respondent is governed by the provisions of the Show

The specific case of the appellant before this Court is that the respondent is governed by the provisions of the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules, 1972 forming part of the Fundamental Rules and Supplementary Rules, though the question as to whether r. 63 of the 1972 Rules is also applicable to the respondent was not specifically urged by the appellant- institute before the High Court. [para 10 and 13] 1.2 Rule 63 of the Central Civil Services (Leave) Rules 1972 mandates that if a Government servant resigns or retires from service or otherwise quits service without returning to duty after a period of study leave or within a period of three years after such return to duty or fails to complete the course of study and is, thus, unable to furnish the certificates as required under sub-rule (5) of Rule 53, he shall be required to refund the actual amount of leave salary, study allowance, cost of fees, travelling and other expenses, if any, incurred by the Government of India. The provision has a laudable object to achieve. The purpose of granting study leave with salary and other benefits is for the interest of the Institution and also the person concerned so that once he comes back and joins the institute, the students will be benefited by the knowledge and expertise acquired by the person at the expense of the institute. [para 14-15] 1.3 A candidate who avails of leave but takes no interest to complete the course and does not furnish the certificate to that effect, is doing a disservice to the institute as well as to its students. Such a person only enjoys the period of study leave without doing any work at the institute and, at the same time, enjoys the salary and other benefits, which is evidentially not in public interest. Public money cannot be spent unless there is mutual benefit. [para 15] 1.4 In the instant case, there is no clear cut provision in the bond either expressly referring to Rule 63 or strictly imposing a condition that if a candidate fails to complete the course study during the period of sanctioned leave, he will have to refund to the Institute the total amount of leave, salary and other benefits availed of by him during the period of study leave. However, such a specific provision was incorporated in bond by the Board of GovernOTHERS of the appellant-institute in its 22nd meeting held on 28.06.2002. [para 10-11] 1.5 The appellant-Institute has already recovered an amount of Rs.6.5 lacs from the salary and arrears of salary of the respondent and claims balance amount of Rs.6,18,000/-.

Court direct the administrative and police officials to take strong measures to prevent such atrocious acts. If any such incidents happen, apart from instituting criminal proceedings against those responsible for such atrocities, the State Governm..

Court direct the administrative and police officials to take strong measures to prevent such atrocious acts. If any such incidents happen, apart from instituting criminal proceedings against those responsible for such atrocities, the State Government is directed to immediately suspend the District Magistrate/Collector and SSP/SPs of the district as well as other officials concerned and charge sheet them and proceed against them departmentally if they do not (1) prevent the incident if it has not already occurred but they have knowledge of it in advance, or (2) if it has occurred, they do not promptly apprehend the culprits and others involved and institute criminal proceedings against them, as in our opinion they will be deemed to be directly or indirectly accountable in this connection

Schedule Case and schedules Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

Court is of the opinion that in cases such as the present, there is considerable uncertainty on the punishment to be awarded in capital offences – whether it should be life imprisonment or death sentence. In our opinion, due to this uncertai..

Court is of the opinion that in cases such as the present, there is considerable uncertainty on the punishment to be awarded in capital offences – whether it should be life imprisonment or death sentence. In our opinion, due to this uncertainty, awarding a sentence of life imprisonment, in cases such as the present is not unquestionably foreclosed. More so when, in this case, there is no evidence (contrary to the conclusion of the High Court) that  Seema’s body was burnt by Sandeep from below the waist with a view to destroy evidence of her having been subjected to sexual harassment and rape. There is also no evidence (again contrary to the conclusion of the High Court) that Narender was a professional killer. 82. Therefore, we allow these appeals to the extent that the death penalty awarded to the appellants is converted into a sentence of life imprisonment, subject to what we have said above. We place on record our appreciation for the efforts put in by both learned counsel for the assistance rendered in this case.  

Indian Penal Code, 1860                    Arms Act, 1959

The Police Authorities of the Gujarat State are directed to handover all the records of the present case to the CBI within two weeks from this date and the CBI shall investigate all aspects of the case relating to the killing of Tulsiram Prajapati..

The Police Authorities of the Gujarat State are directed to handover all the records of the present case to the CBI within two weeks from this date and the CBI shall investigate all aspects of the case relating to the killing of Tulsiram Prajapati and file a report to the concerned court/special court having jurisdiction within a period of six months from the date of taking over of the investigation from the State Police Authorities. We also direct the Police Authorities of the State of Gujarat, Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh to cooperate with the CBI Authorities in conducting the investigation. It is made clear that any observation made in this order is only for the limited purpose of deciding the issue whether investigation is to be handed over to the CBI or not and shall not be construed as expression of opinion on the merits of the case. Though the petitioner has prayed for compensation for the killing of her son, inasmuch as we direct the CBI to investigate and submit a report before the court concerned/special court within six months, depending on the outcome of the investigation, petitioner is permitted to move the said court for necessary direction for compensation and it is for the said court to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. The writ petition is allowed on the above terms. 

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

So far as the court is concerned, the petitioner-appellant is a suspect/accused in the offence of murder. No special treatment can be given to the petitioner-appellant simply on the ground that he is a sitting Member of Parliament. However, keepin..

So far as the court is concerned, the petitioner-appellant is a suspect/accused in the offence of murder. No special treatment can be given to the petitioner-appellant simply on the ground that he is a sitting Member of Parliament. However, keeping in view the fact that the CBI has submitted the supplementary charge-sheet and that the trial is likely to take a long time, we deem it appropriate to enlarge the petitioner-appellant on bail, subject to the following conditions: (i) On his furnishing personal security in the sum of Rs.5 lacs with two solvent sureties, each of the like amount, to the satisfaction of the trial court. (ii) The petitioner-appellant shall appear in Court as and when directed by the court. 

Indian Penal Code, 1860              Arms Act, 1959

In the light of the entire factual scenario, particularly, the objection relating to bias which came to be raised at the fag end of the trial that is on the eve of passing orders, as observed earlier, we are not inclined to entertain such objectio..

In the light of the entire factual scenario, particularly, the objection relating to bias which came to be raised at the fag end of the trial that is on the eve of passing orders, as observed earlier, we are not inclined to entertain such objection. The Presiding Judge, in our view, will take note of the grievance expressed and eliminate the apprehension of the appellant. It goes without saying that every litigant is entitled to fair justice.13) Independence of judiciary is the basic feature of the Constitution. It demands that a Judge who presides over the trial, the Public Prosecutor who presents the case on behalf of the State and the lawyer vis-a-vis amicus curiae who represents the accused must work together in harmony in the public interest of justice uninfluenced by the personality of the accused or those managing the affairs of the State. They must ensure that their working does not lead to creation of conflict between justice and jurisprudence.

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

By virtue of Sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Show

By virtue of Sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 the appellant incurred the disqualification as he has been sentenced to 3 years R.I. Sub-section (4) of Section 8 provides that if on the date of the conviction, a person is a Member of the Parliament then notwithstanding anything in Sub-section (3), the disqualification mentioned therein shall not take effect until 3 months have elapsed from the date of order of conviction and if within that period an appeal is brought in respect of the conviction or sentence, until that appeal or application is disposed of by the Court. Since the appellant was a sitting Member of Parliament, he would not have incurred the disqualification as provided in Sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Act, for a period of 3 months and if within that period he had filed an appeal until the decision of the appeal. Therefore, the appellant could have easily avoided the incurring of the disqualification by filing an appeal within three months from the date of his conviction by the High Court. [Para 2] [1150-A-D] K. Prabhakaran v. P. Jayarajan, [2005] 1 SCC 754, referred to. 2. Sub-section (1) of Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 says that pending any appeal by a convicted person, the appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, he be released on bail, or on his own bond. This Sub-section confers power not only to suspend the execution of sentence and to grant bail but also to suspend the operation of the order appealed against which means the order of conviction. The legal position is, therefore, clear that an appellate Court can suspend or grant stay of order of conviction. But the person seeking stay of conviction should specifically draw the attention of the appellate Court to the consequences that may arise if the conviction is not stayed. Unless the attention of the Court is drawn to the specific consequences that would follow on account of the conviction, the person convicted cannot obtain an order of stay of conviction.

Dismissing the writ petitions, the Court HELD: 1.1 Section 3 read with s. 4 of the Show

Dismissing the writ petitions, the Court HELD: 1.1 Section 3 read with s. 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 clearly mandates that apart from an offence punishable under the PC Act, any conspiracy to commit or any attempt to commit or any abetment of any of the offences specified thereunder can also be tried by a Special Judge. Sub-s. (3) of s. 4 specifies that a Special Judge, when trying any case, can also try any offence, other than an offence specified in s.3, with which the accused may, under the Cr.P.C., be charged at the same trial. In view of s. 22 of PC Act, provisions of the Cr.P.C. are to be applied to trials for offence under the PC Act, subject to certain modifications. [para 17-18] 1.2 The second supplementary charge-sheet dated 12.12.2011 was filed in the FIR No. RC DAI 2009 A 0045 dated 21.10.2009. From the said second charge-sheet it is clear that the offences are alleged to have been committed by the petitioners in the course of 2G Scam Cases and, as such, they have been made accused in the 2G Scam Case. [para 21] 1.3 The co-accused of 2G Scam case charged under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act can be tried only by the Special Judge. The Special Judge alone can take cognizance of the offence specified in s. 3 (1) of PC Act and conspiracy in relation thereto. A magistrate cannot take cognizance of offence as specified in s. 3 (1) of the PC Act. The petitioners are co-accused in the said 2GScam case. In this background s. 220,Cr.P.C. will apply and the petitioners though accused of different offences, i.e., u/s 420/120-B IPC, alleged to have been committed in the course of 2G Spectrum transactions, u/s 223 of Cr. P.C. they may be charged and can be tried together with the other co-accused of 2G Scam cases. 

The considered view that materials on record do not show that Shri P. Chidambaram had abused his position as a Minister of Finance or conspired or colluded with A. Raja so as to fix low entry fee by non-visiting spectrum charges fixed in the year ..

The considered view that materials on record do not show that Shri P. Chidambaram had abused his position as a Minister of Finance or conspired or colluded with A. Raja so as to fix low entry fee by non-visiting spectrum charges fixed in the year 2001. No materials are also made available even for a prima facie conclusion that Shri P. Chidambaram had deliberately allowed dilution of equity of the two companies, i.e. Swan and Unitech. No materials is also available even prima facie to conclude that Shri P. Chidambaram had abused his official position, or used any corrupt or illegal means for obtaining any pecuniary advantage for himself or any other persons, including Shri A. Raja. 

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Dismissing the petitions, the Court HELD: 1.1. The petitioner has been convicted of serious offences. Of course, his conviction and sentence have been challenged before this Court in an appeal. The petitioner is a well-known cine artist and becaus..

Dismissing the petitions, the Court HELD: 1.1. The petitioner has been convicted of serious offences. Of course, his conviction and sentence have been challenged before this Court in an appeal. The petitioner is a well-known cine artist and because of his contribution to art and cinema he has got large number of fans throughout the country and abroad. The petitioner is not a habitual criminal nor has it been brought to the notice of the Court that he was involved in any other criminal case. Despite all these favourable circumstances, this is not a fit case where conviction and sentence could be suspended so that the bar u/s 8(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 will not operate against the petitioner. [Para 6] [193-C-F] 1.2. Law prohibits any person who has been convicted of any offence and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than two years from contesting the election and such person shall be disqualified for a further period of six years since his release. In the face of such a provision, the power of the Court u/s 389 Cr.P.C. shall be exercised only under exceptional circumstances. [Para 6] [193-G-H] 1.3. In view of the serious offence of which the petitioner has been convicted by the Special Judge, this Court is not inclined to suspend the conviction and sentence awarded by the Special Judge. [Para 8] [194-D] Navjot Singh Sidhu vs. State of Punjab AND ANOTHER (2007) 2 SCC 574, distinguished. Prakash Kumar vs. State of Gujarat (2005) 2 SCC 409 and Rama Narang vs. Ramesh Narang (1995) 2 SCC 513, cited. Case Law Reference: (2007) 2 SCC 574 distinguished Para 4 (2005) 2 SCC 409 cited Para 4 (1995) 2 SCC 513 cited Para 4 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Crl.M.Nos. 4087, 5229, 5230, 5237 AND 5314 of 2009 Criminal Appeal No. 1060 of 2007. IN From the Judgment AND Order dated 31.07.2007 of the Designated Court Greater Bombay, Maharashtra in Bomb Blast Case No. 1/1993. Gopal Subramanium, ASG, Harish N. Salve, Mukul Rohtagi, Soli J. Sorabjee, K.T.S. Tulsi, Ranjit Kumar, Kanak Raj, Mukul Rohtagi, Ankur Chawla, Gaurav Bhatia, Minakshi, Hari Shankar K. Harshvardhan Jha, Vikas Singh, Ashish Jha, Alok Saran, R.S. Massy Verma (for T.N. Rao), Manoj Saxena, Rahul Shukla, Sunil Fernandes, P.V. Yogeswaran, Rajat Jariwal, Prashant Bhushan, Rohit Kumar Singh, Karan Singh, Hari Shankar K. Vikas Singh, Jangra, Satya Kam, Raghenth Basant (for B.K. Prasad) for the appearing parties.

Arms Act, 1959

The appellant had neither received the bribe money nor was he present at the spot when the same was received by the co-accused, who handed over the same to `M', but the involvement of the appellant did not require his presence at the time of t..

The appellant had neither received the bribe money nor was he present at the spot when the same was received by the co-accused, who handed over the same to `M', but the involvement of the appellant did not require his presence at the time of the raid as he was connected with the offence in view of Ex.PR which was the paper on which the meter reading was jotted down allegedly by the appellant. Ex.PR was proved by the handwriting expert to be in the handwriting of the appellant. In that context, the question whether the opinion of the handwriting expert could have been relied upon without examining him was relevant. The report of the fingerprint expert who was not examined, indicated that a specimen writing was given by the appellant and on a comparison of the same with the writings in Ex.PR, the fingerprint expert came to the conclusion that they were written by the same person. The trial court skirted the issue by holding that the defence could have examined an expert to rebut the report. The High Court recorded that the report having gone unrebutted could be relied upon without any demur. The views of the trial court as well of the High Court in that regard cannot be accepted. When the trial court chose to rely on the report of the handwriting expert, it ought to have examined the handwriting expert in order to give an opportunity to the appellant and the other accused to cross-examine the said expert. There is nothing on record to show that the appellant and the other accused had admitted the report of the handwriting expert. Both the trial court and the High Court erred in denying the appellant such opportunity and shifting the onus on him to disprove Ex.PR which was not formally proved by the prosecution. It was only the report of the handwriting expert, Ex.PY, which connected the appellant with the offence on account of Ex.PR which was said to be in his handwriting. Since the appellant had neither received the money nor was he present at the spot from where the other accused were apprehended, his case has to be treated on a different footing and since his complicity was not established beyond doubt on the basis of Ex.PR and Ex.PY, he must be given the benefit of doubt. The impugned order is liable to be set aside on this ground alone.

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

The well known maxim `nemo delset bis vexari pro eadem causa' embodies the well established common law rule that no one should be put on peril twice for the same offence. The fundamental right guaranteed under Article 20 (2) has its roots in c..

The well known maxim `nemo delset bis vexari pro eadem causa' embodies the well established common law rule that no one should be put on peril twice for the same offence. The fundamental right guaranteed under Article 20 (2) has its roots in common law maxim nemo debet bis vexari. If a person is charged again for the same offence, he can plead, as a complete defence, his former conviction, or as it is technically expressed, take the plea of autrefois convict. The principle has been recognized in the existing law in India and is enacted in Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. [Paras 13, 14 and 15] [539-F-H; 540-A-E] 1.2 What is prohibited under Article 20 (2) is, the second prosecution and conviction must be for the same offence. If the offences are distinct, there is no question of the rule as to double jeopardy being applicable. The test to ascertain is whether two offences are the same, and not the identity of the allegations but the identity of the ingredients of the offences. Thus, it is clear that the same facts may give rise to different prosecutions and punishment and in such an event the protection afforded by Article 20 (2) is not available. A person can be prosecuted and punished more than once even on substantially same facts provided the ingredients of both the offences are totally different and they did not form the same offence. [Para 17] [541-D-E; 543-B-D] Maqbool Hussain vs. The State of Bombay (1953) SCR 730; S.A. Venkataraman vs. The Union of India & ANOTHER (1954) SCR 1150; Leo Roy Frey vs. Superintendent District Jail, Amritsar (1958) SCR 822; The State of Bombay vs. S.L. Apte (1961) 3 SCR 107; Bhagwan Swarup vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 1965 SC 682; State of Rajasthan vs. Hat Singh and Ors. (2003) 2 SCC 152- referred to. United States vs. Rabinowith (1915) 238 US 78; T.W. Morgan vs. Alfonso J. Devine @ Ollie Devine (1915) 237 U.S.1153; United States vs. Vito Lanza (1922) 260 U.S. 314 - referred to. 1.3 The submission that the facts based on which `M' was prosecuted and punished by a competent court of jurisdiction at Lisbon and the facts based on which prosecution was initiated resulting in conviction are the same and, therefore, the conviction of `M' is in the teeth of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution and Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not well founded since the same set of facts can constitute offences under two different laws.

Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The expression `with or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age' in s. 375, Clause `Sixthly' of the Show

Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The expression `with or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age' in s. 375, Clause `Sixthly' of the Penal Code, 1860 assumes importance where a victim is under sixteen years of age. In the instant case, the prosecutrix had no formal education and, therefore, there is no school certificate available on record. In the FIR, the age of the prosecutrix has been stated to be 13 years. The prosecutrix in her statement u/s 164, Cr.P.C., and her elder brother (PW-1) in his deposition stated her age as 13 years at the relevant time. However, the doctor (PW-5), on the basis of the X-ray as well as physical examination of the prosecutrix, opined that she was 17 years of age. The trial court on consideration of the entire evidence recorded a categorical finding, and rightly, that the prosecutrix was about 17 + years of age at the time of occurrence and, therefore, Clause Sixthly of s.375 IPC is not applicable. [para 10] [419-H; 420-A-C] 1.2 The High Court conjectured that the age of the prosecutrix could be even 19 years. This appears to have been done by adding two years to the age opined by PW-5. There is no such rule much less an absolute one that two years have to be added to the age determined by a doctor. In the instant case, the brother of the prosecutrix has been examined as PW-1 and, therefore, it cannot be said that best evidence has been withheld. 

A defect or irregularity in investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or procedure relating to cognizance or trial. Therefore, where the cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to term..

A defect or irregularity in investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or procedure relating to cognizance or trial. Therefore, where the cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to termination, the invalidity of the precedent investigation does not vitiate the result unless a miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby. The defect or irregularity in investigation has no bearing on the competence of the court or procedure relating to cognizance or trial. [Para 8] [259-D-E] 2.2 In the instant case, the Investigating officer has mentioned in the FIR itself that he had orally been directed by the Superintendent of Police to investigate the case. There is nothing on record to show that the officer's statement is not factually correct. It is evident that there was a direction by the Superintendent of Police to the concerned officer to investigate the case. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the issue as to whether the oral order could meet the requirement of law remains merely a technical issue.

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Held: Since s.7 as well as s.13 of the Show

Held: Since s.7 as well as s.13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act provide for a minimum sentence of six months and one year respectively in addition to the maximum sentences as well as imposition of fine, claim for grant of relief under the Probation of Offenders Act is not permissible - In cases where a specific provision prescribes a minimum sentence, the provisions of the Probation Act cannot be invoked - No valid ground to interfere with the impugned order of the High Court - Appellant to surrender and to undergo remaining period of sentence - Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 - Penal Code, 1860 - s.477A. State Through SP, New Delhi v. Ratan lal Arora 2004 (4) SCC 590: 2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 631 and State Represented by Inspector of Police, Pudukottai T.N. v. A. Parthiban 2006 (11) SCC 473: 2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 35 - relied on. Case Law Reference 2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 631 relied on Para 8 2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 35 relied on Para 8. 

Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 Section 19 (1) of the Show

Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 Section 19 (1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 postulates that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable u/ss 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant except with the previous sanction. The said provision enumerates about the competent authorities. In the case at hand, the competence of the authority who has granted sanction is not in question. [para 5] Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab 1958 SCR 762 =1958 AIR 124 and Basdeo Agarwala v. Emperor AIR 1945 FC 18 - referred to Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. The King AIR 1948 PC 84 - referred to 1.2 From the decision of this Court, the following principles can be culled out: a) It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the valid sanction has been granted by the sanctioning authority after being satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out. b) The sanction order may expressly show that the sanctioning authority has perused the material placed before him and, after consideration of the circumstances, has granted sanction for prosecution. c) The prosecution may prove by adducing the evidence that the material was placed before the sanctioning authority and his satisfaction was arrived at upon perusal of the material placed before him. d) Grant of sanction is only an administrative function and the sanctioning authority is required to prima facie reach the satisfaction that relevant facts would constitute the offence. e) The adequacy of material placed before the sanctioning authority cannot be gone into by the court as it does not sit in appeal over the sanction order. f) If the sanctioning authority has perused all the materials placed before him and some of them have not been proved, that would not vitiate the order of sanction.

A distinction, the foundation of which is classes of the establishments and classes/kind of persons, who frequent the establishments and those who own the establishments cannot be supported under the Constitutional philosophy so clearly stated in ..

A distinction, the foundation of which is classes of the establishments and classes/kind of persons, who frequent the establishments and those who own the establishments cannot be supported under the Constitutional philosophy so clearly stated in the Preamble to the Constitution of India and the individual Articles prohibiting discrimination on the basis of caste, colour, creed, religion or gender. The Preamble to the Constitution of India as also Arts. 14 to 21, as observed in I.R. Coelho* form the heart and soul of the Constitution. Taking away of these rights of equality by any legislation would require clear proof of the justification for such abridgment. [para 100] *I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs. Vs. State of T.N. 2007 (1) SCR 706 = 2007 (2) SCC 1- relied on. 1.2 Section 33A (1) (a) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 prohibits holding of a performance of dance, of any kind or type, in any eating house, permit room or beer bar. This is a complete embargo on performance of dances in the establishment covered u/s 33A (1) . Section 33A contains a non-obstante clause which makes the section stand alone and absolutely independent of the Act and the rules. Contravention of s. 33A (1) makes it a criminal offence and on conviction offender is liable to punishment of 3 years. On the other hand, the establishments covered u/s 33B enjoy complete exemption from any such restrictions and dance performances are permitted provided the establishments comply with the applicable statutory provisions, Bye- Laws, Rules and Regulations. [para 98] 1.3 The classification of the establishments covered u/ss 33A and 33B would not satisfy the test of equality. The distinction is made on the grounds of "classes of establishments" or "classes of persons, who frequent the establishments" and not on the form of dance. There is no justification that a dance permitted in exempted institutions u/s 33B, if permitted in the banned establishment, would be derogatory, exploitative or corrupting of public morality. Rather it is evident that the same dancer can perform the same dance in the exempted institution u/s 33-B but is prohibited of doing so in the establishments covered u/s 33A. There is no rationale which would justify the conclusion that a dance that leads to depravity in one place would get converted to an acceptable performance by a mere change of venue. The discriminatory attitude of the State is illustrated by the fact that an infringement of s. 33A (1) by an establishment covered under the said provision would entail the owner being liable to be imprisoned for three years by virtue of s. 33A (2) . On the other hand, no such punishment is prescribed for establishments covered u/s 33B. Such an establishment would merely lose the licence. Such blatant discrimination cannot possibly be justified on the criteria of reasonable classification under Art. 14 of the Constitution. [para 100-101] State of Jammu and Kashmir Vs. Shri Triloki Nath Khosa AND OTHERS 1974 (1) SCR 771 = 1974 (1) SCC 19
E.V. Chinnaiah Vs. State of A.P. AND OTHERS 2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 972 = 2005 (1) SCC 394
Budhan Choudhry Vs. State of Bihar 1955 SCR 1045 = AIR 1955 SC 191
Laxmi Khandsari AND OTHERS Vs. State of U.P. AND OTHERS 1981 (3) SCR 92 = 1981 (2) SCC 600 - relied on. Radice Vs. People of the State of New York 264 U.S. 292 (1924) - cited. 1.4 Once the respondents had given prima facie proof of the arbitrary classification of the establishments u/ss 33A and 33B, it was duty of the State to justify the reasonableness of the classification. The appellants have failed to justify by acceptable evidence, inevitable consequences or sufficient materials that the restriction, whether partial or complete, is in public interest and contains the quality of reasonableness. There was little or no material on the basis of which the State could have concluded that dancing in the prohibited establishments was likely to deprave, corrupt or injure the public morality or morals. [para 100-101 and 104] 1.5 The so called distinction is based purely on the basis of the class of the performer and the so called superior class of audience. It cannot be presumed that the class to which an individual or the audience belongs brings with him as a necessary concomitant a particular kind of morality or decency. The presumption which runs through ss. 33A and 33B that the enjoyment of same kind of entertainment by the upper classes leads only to mere enjoyment and in the case of poor classes it would lead to immorality, decadence and depravity, cannot be accepted. Morality and depravity cannot be pigeon-holed by degrees depending upon the classes of the audience. The said presumption is also perplexing on the ground that in the banned establishments even a non-obscene dance would be treated as vulgar. On the other hand, it would be presumed that in the exempted establishments any dance is non-obscene. The underlying presumption at once puts the prohibited establishments in a precarious position, in comparison to the exempted class for the grant of a licence to hold a dance performance. The presumption is elitist, which cannot be countenanced under the egalitarian philosophy of the Constitution. Thus, ss. 33A and 33B introduce an invidious discrimination which cannot be justified under Art. 14 of the Constitution. Yet at the same time, both kinds of establishments are to be granted licenses and regulated by the same restrictions, regulations and standing provisions. [para 102-103] Charanjit Lal Chowdhury Vs. Union of India AND OTHERS 1950 SCR 869 =AIR 1951 SC 41
Ram Krishna Dalmia Vs. Justice S.R. Tendolkar 1959 SCR 279 =AIR 1958 SC 538
State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Kaushailiya AND OTHERS 1964 SCR 1002 = AIR 1964 SC 416
and Shashikant Laxman Kale AND ANOTHER Vs. Union of India AND ANOTHER 1990 (3) SCR 441 =1990 (4) SCC 366 - referred to. 1.6 A perusal of the Objects and the Reasons would show that the impugned legislation proceeds on a hypothesis that different dance bars are being used as meeting points of criminals and pick up points of the girls. But the Objects and Reasons say nothing about any evidence having been presented to the Government that these dance bars are actively involved in trafficking of women. Isolated examples would not be sufficient to establish the connection of the dance bars covered u/s 33A with trafficking. Therefore, it cannot be said that the ban has been placed for the protection of the vulnerable women. [para 105] 1.7 The Legislature is free to recognize the degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be clearest. Further, the State may direct its law against what it deems the evil as it actually exists without covering the whole field of possible abuses, but such conclusion have to be reached either on the basis of general consensus shared by the majority of the population or on the basis of empirical data. The State neither had the empirical data to conclude that dancing in the prohibited establishment necessarily leads to depravity and corruption of public morals nor was there general consensus that such was the situation. The three reports presented before the High Court in fact have presented divergent view points.

Demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non for constituting an offence under the Show

Demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non for constituting an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Mere recovery of tainted money is not sufficient to convict the accused, unless there is evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show that the money was taken voluntarily as a bribe. While invoking the provision of statutory presumption u/s 20 of the Act, the court is required to consider the explanation offered by the accused, if any, only on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and not on the touchstone of proof beyond all reasonable doubt. However, before the accused is called upon to explain how the amount in question was found in his possession, the foundational facts must be established by the prosecution. The complainant is an interested and partisan witness, concerned with the success of the trap, and his evidence must be tested in the same way as that of any other interested witness. In a proper case, the court may look for independent corroboration before convicting the accused.

The view taken by the trial court drawn on the evidence on record is unreasonable and perverse and the High Court has rightly interfered with the order of acquittal and convicted the appellant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13 (2) of Pr..

The view taken by the trial court drawn on the evidence on record is unreasonable and perverse and the High Court has rightly interfered with the order of acquittal and convicted the appellant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. [Para 11] [446-C-D] Kalyan Singh v. State of M.P. (2006) 13 SCC 303; T. Subramanian v. State of T.N. (2006) 1 SCC 401; State represented by Inspector of Police, Pudukottai, T.N. v. A. Parthiban (2006) 11 SCC 473 - referred to. 1.2 The evidence of the complainant is found to be consistent and impeachable regarding the demand of Rs.500/- by the appellant as bribe money for giving favourable report in regard to the grant of permanent lease holder rights of the land to the complainant. His evidence is supported by contemporaneous documents prepared by the Investigating Officer before the money was delivered to the appellant. The complainant emphatically denied the suggestion of the appellant that Rs.500/- was sent to the appellant by DW-1 as repayment of the loan amount. The complainant, the investigating Officer and other witnesses who were present when the appellant was caught red handed by the Anti Corruption Team have been cross-examined at length by the defence, but nothing tangible has been extracted from their evidence to create any shadow of doubt that they are not truthful witnesses. They have given reliable and consistent version of the crime and their evidence inspires confidence. [Para 9] [465-F-G-H; 466- A] 1.3 Once it is proved that the money was recovered from the possession of the appellant, the burden of presumption as contemplated u/s. 20 of the P.C. Act, 1988 shifts upon the appellant, which he could not rebut through cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses or by adducing reliable and convincing evidence to prove that DW-1 advanced Rs.500/- as loan to the appellant through the complainant. [Para 9] [464-H; 465-A] 1.4 DW-1 has not given any reason why he chose the complainant alone to deliver a sum of Rs.500/- to the appellant on the day when he was apprehended by the Anti Corruption Team

The High Court analysed in great detail the evidence to show that the alleged animosity was not established. Two witnesses PWs 2 and 3 in detail had referred to the factual scenario and nothing discrepant has been brought on record to cast any dou..

The High Court analysed in great detail the evidence to show that the alleged animosity was not established. Two witnesses PWs 2 and 3 in detail had referred to the factual scenario and nothing discrepant has been brought on record to cast any doubt on the credibility of their evidence. [Para 6] [648-B] 2. Day in and day out the gigantic problem of corruption in the public service is on the increase. Large scale corruption retards the nation- building activities and everyone has to suffer on that count.Corruption is corroding like cancerous lymph nodes, the vital veins of the body politics, social fabric of efficiency in the public service and demoralizing the honest officers. The efficiency in public service would improve only when the public servant devotes his sincere attention and does the duty diligently, truthfully, honestly and devotes himself assiduously to the performance of the duties of his post. [Para 7] [648-C-E] Swatantar Singh v. State of Haryana (1997) 4 SCC 14 and State of M.P. v. Shambhu Dayal Nagar (2002) 1 SCC 1, relied on. 3. Considering the peculiar facts of the case, the custodial sentence of one year, which is minimum prescribed, would meet the ends of justice. [Para 8] [648-F] Case Law Reference: (1997) 4 SCC 14 relied on Para 7 (2002) 1 SCC 1 relied on Para 7 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 156 of 2009. From the Judgment and Order dated 11.9.2007 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. Appeal No. 416-SB/1996. Manoj Prasad for the Appellant. Kuldip Singh, R.K. Pandey, T.P. Mishra and H.S. Sandhu for the Respondent.

Criminal appeal should not be dealt in this way - Thus, order of High Court set aside - Matter remitted to High Court for fresh consideration - Practice and procedure - Show

Criminal appeal should not be dealt in this way - Thus, order of High Court set aside - Matter remitted to High Court for fresh consideration - Practice and procedure - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Ramesh Chandra Pandey for the Appellant. R. Sundervardan, D. Bharathi Reddy and A. Fatima for the Respondent.

The offence of rape in its simplest term is `the ravishment of a woman, without her consent, by force, fear or fraud', or as `the carnal knowledge of a woman by force against her will'. `Rape'

The confession was indeed made by the appellant and the details given in the confession and the meticulous planning that went behind committing murder of the deceased which has been reflected in the confession, not only render it voluntary, but tr..

The confession was indeed made by the appellant and the details given in the confession and the meticulous planning that went behind committing murder of the deceased which has been reflected in the confession, not only render it voluntary, but truthful also. This confession is not only a good, voluntary and truthful confession but a reliable one also and the trial court has committed no mistake whatsoever in relying upon the said confession. Once the confession made u/s. 15 of the TADA Act is accepted, there is no necessity of any other evidence being required. The way the appellant himself has worked for the success of the conspiracy, the way he has handled the guns and accompanied two other assailants to the house of the deceased and the manner in which the plan was executed convinces that the order is absolutely correct. [Paras 32 and 33] [950-D-H; 951-A-C] 2.6. The whole cross-examination does not dent the case of the prosecution and it can be inferred that the criticism against the confession that it was not recorded in the language of the accused is not justified. There is absolutely no effort made by the defence to establish that the statement was not made in the language of the accused persons. The confession also cannot be foiled on the ground that the original confessional statement was not on record as the original confession was very much available on the record. [Para 21] [940-D-F] 2.7. The failure to examine two-persons (`GS' and `GQ) as witnesses, would be of no consequence looking at the overall evidence of the witnesses, more particularly, all those who were present at the spot. It cannot be gathered that `GS' was present at the time of incident. Insofar as the evidence of `GQ' is concerned, it was pointed out by PW-17 that said person was already dead at the time of trial. [Para 22] [940-G-H; 941-A-B] 3. It is not correct to say that the confession u/s. 15 of TADA Act could have been used only against the TADA Act offences and it cannot be used for a Non-TADA offence like Section 302 of the RPC and it could not even be read in order to prove the said offence. The facts relating to Section 3(3) of the TADA Act and the facts relating to Section 302 of RPC are completely inter-mixed in this matter. They are the part of the same transaction. A plain reading of the confession clearly goes to show that the accused was guilty of conspiring or attempting to commit or advocating, abetting, advising or inciting or knowingly facilitating the commission of a terrorist act or any act preparatory to a terrorist act.